Chapter 8

Defensive Operations

*Little minds try to defend everything at once, but sensible people look at the main point only; they parry the worst blows and stand a little hurt if thereby they avoid a greater one. If you try to hold everything, you hold nothing.*

Frederick the Great

8-1. Army forces defend until they gain sufficient strength to attack. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Alone, defensive operations normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counter-offensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Although offensive operations are usually required to achieve decisive results, it is often necessary, even advisable at times, to defend. Commanders defend to buy time, hold terrain, facilitate other operations, preoccupy the enemy, or erode enemy resources.

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PURPOSES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

8-2. The purpose of defensive operations is to defeat enemy attacks. Defending forces await the attacker’s blow and defeat the attack by successfully deflecting it. Waiting for the attack is not a passive activity. Army commanders seek out enemy forces to strike and weaken them before close combat begins.

8-3. Operationally, defensive operations buy time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for resuming offensive operations. Therefore, major operations and campaigns combine defensive operations with offensive
operations. Operational-level defensive operations normally include offensive, stability, and support operations.

8-4. During force projection, defensive operations by in-theater or early arriving forces can maintain the operational initiative for joint or multinational forces. If conditions do not support offensive operations, initial-entry forces defend the lodgment while the joint force commander builds combat power. Initial-entry forces should include sufficient combat power to deter, attack, or defend successfully.

CHARACTERISTICS OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

8-5. Successful defenses are aggressive; they use direct, indirect, and air-delivered fires; information operations (IO); and ground maneuver to strike the enemy. They maximize firepower, protection, and maneuver to defeat enemy forces. Static and mobile elements combine to deprive the enemy of the initiative. The defender resists and contains the enemy. Defending commanders seek every opportunity to transition to the offensive.

8-6. While the fundamentals of the defense continue to apply to a modernized force, advanced technology systems modify the way commanders conduct defensive operations. Greater understanding of friendly and enemy situations and the fusion of command and control (C2); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); long-range precision fires; and combat service support (CSS) technologies make the mobile defense even more lethal and effective. Whenever practical, commanders of modernized forces use the mobile defense because it takes maximum advantage of Army force strengths.

8-7. An effective defense engages the enemy with static and mobile forces. It combines the elements of combat power to erode enemy strength and create conditions for a counterattack. Defenders seek to increase their freedom to maneuver while denying it to the attacker. The enemy falters as losses increase and the initiative shifts to the defender, allowing counterattacks. Counterattack opportunities rarely last long; defenders strike swiftly to force the enemy to culminate. Preparation, security, disruption, massing effects, and flexibility all characterize successful defensive operations.

PREPARATION

8-8. The defense has inherent strengths. The defender arrives in the area of operations (AO) before the attacker and uses the available time to prepare. Defenders study the ground and select positions that allow massing fires on likely approaches. They combine natural and manmade obstacles to canalize attacking forces into engagement areas. Defending forces coordinate and rehearse actions on the ground, gaining intimate familiarity with the terrain. They place security and reconnaissance forces throughout the AO. These preparations multiply the effectiveness of the defense. Preparation ends only when defenders retrograde or begin to fight. Until then, preparations are continuous. Preparations in depth continue, even as the close fight begins.

SECURITY

8-9. Commanders secure their forces principally through security operations, force protection, and IO. Security operations help deceive the enemy as to
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friendly locations, strengths, and weaknesses. They also inhibit or defeat enemy reconnaissance operations. These measures provide early warning and disrupt enemy attacks early and continuously. Force protection efforts preserve combat power. Offensive IO inaccurately portray friendly forces and mislead enemy commanders through military deception, operations security, and electronic warfare. These measures contribute to the defender’s security.

DISRUPTION

8-10. Defenders disrupt attackers’ tempo and synchronization with actions designed to prevent them from massing combat power. Disruptive actions attempt to un hinge the enemy’s preparations and, ultimately, his attacks. Methods include defeating or misdirecting enemy reconnaissance forces, breaking up his formations, isolating his units, and attacking or disrupting his systems. Defenders never allow attackers to fully prepare. They use spoiling attacks before enemies can focus combat power, and counterattack before they can consolidate any gains. Defenders target offensive IO against enemy C2 systems and constantly disrupt enemy forces in depth.

MASSING EFFECTS

8-11. Defenders seek to mass the effects of overwhelming combat power where they choose and shift it to support the decisive operation. To obtain an advantage at decisive points, defenders economize and accept risk in some areas; retain and, when necessary, reconstitute a reserve; and maneuver to gain local superiority at the point of decision. Defenders may surrender some ground to gain time to concentrate forces.

8-12. Commanders accept risk in some areas to mass effects elsewhere. Obstacles, security forces, and fires can assist in reducing risk. Since concentrating forces increases the threat of large losses from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), commanders use deception and concealment to hide force concentrations. They also protect their forces with air and missile defenses.

FLEXIBILITY

8-13. Defensive operations require flexible plans. Planning focuses on preparations in depth, use of reserves, and the ability to shift the main effort. Commanders add flexibility by designating supplementary positions, designing counterattack plans, and preparing to counterattack.

TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

8-14. The three types of defensive operations are the mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde. All apply at both the tactical and operational levels of war. Mobile defenses orient on destroying attacking forces by permitting the enemy to advance into a position that exposes him to counterattack. Area defenses orient on retaining terrain; they draw the enemy in an interlocking series of positions and destroy him largely by fires. Retrogrades move friendly forces away from the enemy to gain time, preserve forces, place the enemy in unfavorable positions, or avoid combat under undesirable conditions. Defending commanders combine the three types to fit the situation.
8-15. All three types of defense use mobile and static elements. In mobile defenses, static positions help control the depth and breadth of the enemy penetration and retain ground from which to launch counterattacks. In area defenses, commanders closely integrate patrols, security forces and sensors, and reserve forces to cover gaps among defensive positions. They reinforce positions as necessary and counterattack as directed. In retrograde operations, some units conduct area or mobile defenses or security operations to protect other units that execute carefully controlled maneuver or movement rearward. They use static elements to fix, disrupt, turn, or block the attackers. They use mobile elements to strike and destroy the enemy.

**MOBILE DEFENSE**

8-16. The *mobile defense* is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (see Figure 8-1). A mobile defense requires defenders to have greater mobility than attackers. Defenders combine offensive, defensive, and delaying actions to lure attackers into positions where they are vulnerable to counterattack. Commanders take advantage of terrain in depth, military deception, obstacles, and mines while employing fires and maneuver to wrest the initiative from the attacker.

![Figure 8-1. Mobile Defense](image)

8-17. Commanders commit the minimum force necessary to purely defensive tasks. They place maximum combat power in a striking force that
counterattacks as the enemy maneuvers against friendly positions. Striking forces are considered committed throughout the operation. They have one task: plan, prepare, and execute the decisive operation—the counterattack. Defenders draw attackers into terrain that enables the striking force to counterattack from an unexpected direction. They press the counterattack with overwhelming force and violence.

8-18. In planning a counterattack, commanders consider enemy options and the likely locations of possible follow-on forces. Commanders decide where to position the striking force, what routes and avenues of approach to use, what fire support is necessary, and what interdiction or attack on follow-on forces will isolate the enemy. They combine military deception and security operations to render enemy reconnaissance ineffective.

8-19. In addition to the striking force, commanders designate a reserve, if forces are available. Reserves are uncommitted forces and may execute numerous missions. They give the commander flexibility. Reserves support fixing forces, ensuring that the defense establishes conditions for success of the counterattack. If the reserve is available after the commander commits the striking force, it exploits the success of the striking force.

AREA DEFENSE

8-20. The area defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (see Figure 8-2, page 8-6). The bulk of defending forces combine static defensive positions, engagement areas, and small, mobile reserves to retain ground. Keys to successful area defenses include effective and flexible control, synchronization, and distribution of fires. Area defenses employ security forces on likely enemy avenues of approach. Commanders employ a reserve with priority to the counterattack. Other potential reserve missions include blocking enemy penetrations and reinforcing other portions of the defense. Area defenses can also be part of a larger mobile defense.

8-21. Area defenses vary in depth, design, and purpose according to the situation. Commanders deny or retain key terrain if the friendly situation gives no other option or friendly forces are outnumbered. Lower-echelon tactical units may position their forces in battle positions on suitable terrain. On occasion, commanders may use a strong point to deny key terrain to the enemy and force his movement in a different direction. Constructing a strong point requires considerable time and engineer support.

RETROGRADE

8-22. A retrograde is a type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the enemy. The three forms of retrograde operations are withdrawals, delays, and retirements. Commanders use
Withdrawal

8-23. A withdrawal, a form of retrograde, is a planned operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force. Withdrawals may involve all or part of a committed force. Commanders conduct withdrawals to preserve the force, release it for a new mission, avoid combat under undesirable conditions, or reposition forces. Enemy pressure may or may not be present during withdrawals. At tactical echelons, withdrawing forces may be unassisted or assisted by another friendly force.

8-24. In a corps or division withdrawal, commanders organize a security force and a main body. The security force prevents the enemy from interfering with the withdrawal. The main body forms behind the security force and moves away from the enemy; the security force remains between the enemy and the main body and conceals main body preparations and movement. If the withdrawal begins without being detected, the security force may remain in position to prolong the concealment. After the main body withdraws a safe distance, the security force moves to intermediate or final positions. If the enemy detects the withdrawal and attacks, the security force delays to allow...
the main body to withdraw. Main body units may reinforce the security force if necessary. They will themselves delay or defend if the security force fails to slow the enemy.

8-25. Commanders plan for and employ air and ground reserves, indirect and missile counterfire, and air defenses. Corps and division reserves remain near main body units to assist withdrawing units by fire and maneuver, if needed. Corps and division reserves may execute spoiling attacks to disorganize and delay the enemy or to extricate encircled or decisively engaged forces.

8-26. Commanders use IO and security operations when withdrawing to deny the enemy information and present false information. They avoid moving forces prematurely or revealing other actions that could signal their withdrawal plans. For example, relocating combat support (CS) and CSS facilities, emplacing obstacles, and destroying routes may signal a withdrawal. To seize the initiative, commanders direct offensive IO that include measures to conceal withdrawal preparations.

8-27. Commanders dedicate resources and plan for future operations when withdrawing. The ability to conduct a timely withdrawal is especially dependent upon sufficient transpport. CSS planners assist in developing courses of action and adjust sustaining operations to conform to the commander’s decisions. A withdrawal ends when the force breaks contact and transitions to another operation. Forces may withdraw into a defended area and join its defense, withdraw into a secure area and prepare for future operations, or continue away from the enemy in a retirement.

Delay

8-28. A delay is a form of retrograde in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged. Delays gain time for friendly forces to—

- Establish defenses.
- Cover defending or withdrawing units.
- Protect friendly unit flanks.
- Contribute to economy of force.
- Draw the enemy into unfavorable positions.
- Determine the enemy main effort.

8-29. Commanders direct delays when their forces are insufficient to attack or conduct an area or mobile defense. A delay is also appropriate as a shaping operation to draw the enemy into an area for subsequent counterattack. Commanders specify the critical parameters of the delay:

- Its duration.
- Terrain to retain or deny.
- The nature of subsequent operations.

8-30. Delays can involve units as large as a corps and may be part of a general withdrawal. Divisions may conduct delays as part of a corps defense or withdrawal. In a delay, units may fight from a single set of positions or delay using alternate or successive positions. A delay ends when—
• Enemy forces halt their attack. Friendly forces can then maintain contact, withdraw, or counterattack.
• Friendly forces transition to the defense.
• The delaying force completes its mission and passes through another force or breaks contact.
• The friendly force counterattacks and transitions to the offense.

8-31. Delaying units should be at least as mobile as attackers. Commanders take measures to increase friendly mobility and decrease enemy mobility. Open, unobstructed terrain that provides friendly force mobility requires major engineering efforts to hinder enemy mobility. Close or broken terrain slows the enemy but also makes it more difficult to maintain contact and may hinder friendly movement.

Retirement

8-32. A retirement is a form of retrograde in which a force not in contact with the enemy moves away from the enemy. Typically, forces move away from the enemy by executing a tactical road march. Retiring units organize to fight but do so only in self-defense. Retirements are usually not as risky as delays and withdrawals.

Risk in Retrograde

8-33. Retrogrades require firm control and risk management. They increase psychological stress among soldiers, who may see movement away from the enemy as a sign of defeat. Unless held in check, such concerns can lead to panic and a rout. Successful retrogrades require strong leadership, thorough planning, effective organization, and disciplined execution. Friendly troops move swiftly but deliberately. A disorganized retrograde in the presence of a strong enemy invites disaster. Commanders manage risk during retrogrades with these measures:
• Avoiding decisive engagement. Reserves and massed indirect and joint fires can assist in accomplishing this.
• Preparing plans to enhance rapid, controlled execution.
• Denying the enemy information on unit movement.
• Avoiding surprise with continuously updated intelligence.
• Combining deception and delaying actions to prevent the enemy from closing in strength.

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS WITHIN THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

8-34. Commanders use the operational framework (AO, battlespace, and battlefield organization) to conduct defensive operations (see Figure 8-3). Commanders base their framework on METT-TC and an understanding of their battlespace. They conduct simultaneous and sequential decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations in depth by synchronizing their forces in time, space, resources, purpose, and action. Commanders may designate deep, close, and rear areas when conducting operations that are generally linear and contiguous.
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Area of Operations

Security Operations

Decisive Operation

Striking Force

Battlespace encompasses all things commanders must understand to apply combat power effectively.

Figure 8-3. Operational Framework in the Defense

8-35. Commanders deny enemy forces freedom of movement within the gaps formed by extended, noncontiguous AOs. They dominate their entire AO throughout the operation, assigning responsibility for unoccupied ground and allocating combat power. When commanders designate subordinate unit AOs that are noncontiguous, they retain responsibility for portions of their AO not assigned to subordinates. Regardless of the proximity or separation of its elements, commanders see their defense as a continuous whole. They fight decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations as one action, synchronizing simultaneous operations to accomplish a single purpose: defeating the attack and quickly transitioning to the offense.

DECISIVE OPERATIONS IN THE DEFENSE

8-36. The decisive operation in a defense defeats the enemy attack. In a mobile defense, the counterattack by the striking force is the decisive operation. The more commanders know about the enemy situation, the more they can weight the counterattack. In area defenses, defeating the enemy attack within engagement areas is the decisive operation. Commanders draw the enemy into engagement areas, where defenders destroy them using massed fires, obstacles, and other assets.

8-37. Throughout the execution of mobile and area defenses, commanders designate a main effort and synchronize the battlefield operating systems (BOS) to support it. If necessary, they shift their main effort to concentrate forces and mass effects. Defending commanders may shift their main effort
repeatedly to defeat an attack. If they correctly anticipate enemy actions, commanders can execute their plan for the decisive operation despite shifting the main effort. They always designate the decisive operation as the main effort at the decisive point.

8-38. Reserves preserve commanders’ flexibility and provide a hedge against uncertainty. Once, the reserve is committed, its operation becomes the main effort. If commanders commit their reserve, they should immediately designate another from uncommitted forces or forces in less threatened areas. Commanders may employ reserves throughout the operation. Typical reserve missions include counterattacking, reinforcing, blocking, and destroying a penetration. Commanders avoid assigning tasks to the reserve other than those required to support planning and preparing for their be-prepared missions. Reserves are best used to reinforce and expedite victory rather than prevent defeat. The concept of operations determines the reserve’s primary mission. Unless otherwise delegated, the commander designating the reserve retains authority for its commitment.

Decisive Defensive Operations—Pusan, Korea

By the end of August 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) occupied most of the Republic of Korea (ROK), less the Pusan pocket on the southeast portion of the peninsula. President Kim Il Sung was amazed at the speed with which the NKPA had moved south, and he assembled 98,000 more troops to crush the Eighth Army. Precariously held, the Pusan pocket contained about 120,000 US and ROK soldiers. The operation became hundreds of large and small engagements marked by thousands of casualties.

The NKPA struck at numerous points along the perimeter, expending men and resources in an effort to create a penetration. But the line held and fresh United Nations (UN) forces arrived to bolster the defense. Sensing that an opportunity was slipping away, the NKPA attacked with increased intensity on 31 August 1950. Despite tremendous punishment by UN air force bombing and strafing, the North Koreans breached the defensive lines in several areas. The 24th Infantry Division counterattacked, while the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st ROK Division held at Taegu. Two enemy divisions struck the 25th Infantry Division in a bloody fight that saw Sobuk Ridge change hands 13 times in less than a month. The line held despite US units giving ground or fighting in isolation. While the NKPA made impressive gains along the perimeter, the defense held and the ports remained open.

The defense of the Pusan perimeter proved decisive in that it broke the North Korean will to continue the attack and fixed remaining enemy forces. Further north, US forces executed Operation Chromite at Inchon, a turning movement that trapped the NKPA, threatened it with imminent destruction, and allowed UN forces in the Pusan pocket to break out and resume offensive operations.
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SHAPING OPERATIONS IN THE DEFENSE

8-39. Shaping operations executed simultaneously throughout the AO support the conduct of the defender's decisive operation by upsetting the attacker's design. They selectively suppress or neutralize the enemy's BOS and disrupt his synchronization. IO shape enemy perceptions and can influence the decision to attack. Fires contribute to shaping operations by attacking high-payoff targets and create conditions for successful decisive operations. Shaping operations in the defense include—

- Countermobility and mobility operations.
- Reconnaissance and security operations.
- Aerial-delivered and long-range precision indirect fires.
- Passages of lines (forward and rearward).
- Actions of fixing forces that shape to support the decisive operation.
- Movements of units that directly facilitate other shaping operations and the decisive operation.
- Actions by reserve forces before their commitment.

8-40. Security forces perform critical functions in the defense. They secure gaps between defending units, protect the force from surprise, meet the leading enemy forces, strip away reconnaissance and security elements, report enemy strengths and locations, and help identify the enemy decisive operation. They harass and slow attacking forces to gain time and space for shaping enemy actions and protecting LOCs, headquarters, fire support units, and reserves.

Shaping Defensive Operations—2d SANG Brigade at Khafji

Defensive operations often have significant political implications. During the evening of 29 January 1991, the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division launched several large probes across the Saudi Arabian border. Elements of the 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) Brigade—a force accompanied by American advisors and a Marine air/naVAL gunfire liaison company—met them at the town of Khafji, Saudi Arabia. The Iraqis seized the town, cutting off two Marine reconnaissance teams, who evaded capture while continuing to call in air and field artillery support. The next day, the 2d SANG Brigade attempted to retake Khafji without success. However, on 31 January, the brigade attacked again, and by 1 February succeeded in clearing Iraqi resistance.

This relatively small tactical action was important because it convinced the theater commander that the Iraqis could not conduct complex operations and were vulnerable to air interdiction. This information helped to shape future coalition operations. The action, by demonstrating that the Saudi forces would fight aggressively, strengthened the coalition and bolstered its will. Lastly, the operation demonstrated that US and coalition forces could conduct successful multinational operations, a discovery with strategic implications.
SUSTAINING OPERATIONS IN THE DEFENSE

8-41. Sustaining operations in the defense occur throughout the AO. Commanders ensure freedom of action and continuity of the defense by conducting CSS operations, rear area and base security, LOC maintenance, movement control, and terrain management.

8-42. Security for sustaining operations is a primary concern. Commanders organize forces and terrain to protect sustaining operations and retain freedom of action. Commanders group forces performing sustaining operations into bases and base clusters for protection and security. Base and base clusters organize for self-defense. Commanders designate response forces and tactical combat forces (TCFs) to augment base cluster self-defense capabilities (see FM 3-90; FM 3-100.7).

8-43. Force projection operations present distinct security challenges for sustaining operations. To protect combat power buildup, combat, CS, and CSS forces operate in the same area while establishing the initial lodgment. Forces conducting sustaining operations take increased active and passive self-protection measures until combat forces are available. Commanders assess threat capabilities, decide where and when to accept risk, and assign units to protect and sustain the force.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR NONLINEAR DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

8-44. Commanders may conduct nonlinear defensive operations in contiguous and noncontiguous AOs. In both cases, defenders focus on destroying enemy forces, even if it means losing physical contact with other friendly units. Successful nonlinear defenses require all friendly commanders to understand the higher commander's intent and share a current common operational picture (COP). They also favor use of a battlefield organization based on decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations rather than deep, close, and rear areas. Noncontiguous defenses are generally mobile defenses; however, some subordinate units may conduct area defenses to hold key terrain or canalize attackers into engagement areas. Even mobile defenses that begin as linear operations often evolve into nonlinear operations. Area defenses are typically more linear operations because of their orientation on terrain.

8-45. Nonlinear defenses place a premium on reconnaissance and surveillance to maintain contact with the enemy, produce relevant information, and develop and maintain a COP. The defending force focuses almost exclusively on defeating the enemy force in depth rather than retaining large areas due to the size of the AO. All forces conducting nonlinear defenses require robust communications and sustainment capabilities. Noncombatants and the fluidity of nonlinear defensive operations require commanders to exercise judgement in clearing fires, both direct and indirect.

CONDUCTING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

8-46. Before deciding how to defend, commanders assess the situation and begin to plan. A simple concept of operations flexible enough to meet the enemy wherever he chooses to attack is essential for success in the defense. Operational-level defenses combine all three types of defensive actions. If defense of a specified area is not required, commanders may draw the enemy
defensive operations deep into their AO and strike his flanks and rear. They use spoiling attacks if conditions favor them.

PLANNING FOR DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

8-47. In planning a defense, operational commanders identify their own and the enemy’s centers of gravity and related decisive points. They also identify the likely way the enemy will attack. Commanders estimate where the enemy will conduct his decisive operation and how to defeat it while maintaining the coherence of the defense. Operational commanders allocate resources and assign AOs to subordinate tactical units. They decide where and when to defend and generally match friendly strength to enemy strength.

8-48. Commanders consider the factors of METT-TC as they plan their defense. They choose defensive positions that force the enemy to make costly attacks or conduct time-consuming maneuvers to avoid them. Commanders plan IO to gain information superiority. Information superiority allows commanders to hide their intentions and deceive the enemy, while degrading the enemy’s ability to synchronize his attack. Commanders plan defensive and counteroffensive operations in depth of time, space, and purpose.

Mission

8-49. The mission flows from the higher headquarters concept of operations. Commanders must understand how their defensive operation contributes to the success of the higher headquarters operation. The nature of the AO and subsequent missions affect the missions commanders assign to subordinates.

Enemy

8-50. Commanders and staffs estimate enemy offensive capabilities, vulnerabilities, and operational design. At tactical levels, commanders estimate enemy strengths, weaknesses, and intent. They infer potential enemy courses of action and focus their estimates on the most dangerous and most likely of them. Commanders and units respect, but are not paralyzed by, enemy capabilities. Defending commanders view themselves and their AOs through the enemy commander’s eyes and anticipate how he might attempt to seize terrain or destroy friendly forces.

8-51. Defending commanders conduct a thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) as part of their visualization. IPB enables commanders and staffs to anticipate the enemy’s objectives and courses of action and helps determine what control measures to use. In particular, planners anticipate enemy use of indirect approaches and capability to attack friendly C2 and sustaining operations.

8-52. Commanders use every resource available to offset attackers’ numerical advantages, identify threats, and mass combat power against their vulnerabilities. Victory requires accurate and timely in-depth targeting of enemy units, facilities, and systems. Real-time fusion of information among C2, ISR, fire support, engineer, aviation, and CSS elements helps commanders do this. A successful defense compels enemies to commit to a course of action before they want to and creates opportunities for friendly forces.
Terrain and Weather

8-53. Defenders analyze the terrain to decide where they can best kill the enemy. Defending large AOs requires commanders to take risks and accept gaps. Smaller AOs may restrict maneuver and limit flexibility. Subordinate unit AOs should extend far enough toward the enemy to give commanders time to assess enemy capabilities and intentions, visualize the operation, decide on a course of action, and execute it. Operational-level commanders consider large-scale geographic features and choose the best terrain for defending based on their mission. The geography should hinder operational mobility of large enemy formations and provide advantages for the operational defense. A defense lacks value if the enemy can readily bypass it, unless the defensive focus is to retain that terrain. Commanders also consider friendly LOCs. Geography determines LOC capacity and the size force LOCs can support. Operational commanders commit significant resources to improve LOCs and friendly mobility, and to degrade enemy operational mobility.

8-54. The commander’s personal reconnaissance is essential. Tactical commanders focus on identifying probable enemy assembly areas, CSS dispositions, field artillery locations, and ground favoring an attack. They also determine the area most advantageous for the enemy decisive operation. Terrain characteristics may determine the shape of the defense. Tactical commanders seek positions that offer effective cover and concealment. The defending force exploits any aspect of terrain that can slow enemy momentum or make it difficult for the enemy to mass effects or conduct maneuver.

8-55. Defenders seek to engage attackers at points where the terrain places them at the greatest disadvantage. Defending commanders use manmade obstacles to improve natural obstacles; to fix, disrupt, turn, or block enemy movement; and to protect friendly positions and maneuver. Some terrain may be so significant to the defense that its loss would prove decisive. In such cases, commanders focus their plan on retaining it.

8-56. Weather and visibility affect how defenders use terrain. Commanders plan for the effects of adverse or limited visibility on weapons systems and optical and thermal devices. A plan that succeeds in clear conditions may be less effective during bad weather. Branches to the basic plan should address necessary modifications to the defense during periods of reduced visibility. Commanders and staffs need local tactical weather information as well as the more general theater-level forecasts.

Troops and Support Available

8-57. As they visualize the operation, commanders consider the capabilities of their force, teamwork, state of training, and leader experience. The firepower, mobility, protection, health, morale, and training of troops determine, to some extent, how they defend. Differences in unit tables of organization and equipment, mobility, training, and leadership make some units more suitable for some missions than for others. In multinational operations, for example, particular defensive arrangements may be necessary to accommodate national pride or interests. Defenders exploit relative strengths in tactics and capabilities that give defenders advantages over the attackers. These may include air
assault and attack helicopter capabilities, night combat experience, long-range precision fires, intelligence, and battle command.

**Time Available**

8-58. The time available to prepare is a crucial factor. The defense is more effective when time is available to plan decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations; conduct reconnaissance and deliberately occupy positions; fortify the ground, plan fires, and install obstacles; coordinate maneuver, fires, and CSS; and rehearse. Commanders at all echelons manage their resources to prepare the best defense time allows. They establish priorities of support that focus work on the unit designated to conduct the decisive operation. They set priorities to focus units on the most important tasks.

8-59. Small units train to defend with minimal preparation when necessary; however, strong defenses take time to organize and prepare. To gain time for the main body to organize the defense, commanders may order a delay by a covering force or a spoiling attack by ground or air units. Lack of time and uncertainty about factors such as the enemy order of battle, main effort, and objectives may compel commanders to designate a larger reserve or accept greater risk. It may also determine the type of defense to be employed.

**Civil Considerations**

8-60. International law and moral imperatives require Army forces to consider the effects of operations on civilian populations. The defense of national boundaries may require operational commanders to defend in less depth than they would like. The presence of culturally, economically, and politically significant assets may limit the range of options. Countermobility operations directed at economically important roads, railways, and bridges might be prohibited. When Army forces must damage areas that are important to civilians, they ensure that civilian leaders and populations understand why these actions are necessary.

8-61. AOs with large civilian populations often require a portion of the force to conduct support operations. Units may expend significant resources to evacuate endangered populations. Commanders implement restrictive fire support coordinating measures to protect civilian facilities and areas, consistent with rules of engagement (see FM 3-09). Army forces must consider civilian movements when emplacing minefields.

**PREPARING FOR DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS**

8-62. Defensive preparations begin as early as possible and continue throughout the operation. Parallel planning facilitates simultaneous preparation at all command levels. As staffs prepare plans, leaders conduct a personal reconnaissance. There is no substitute for actually seeing and walking the defensive area. Commanders at all echelons integrate adjustments resulting from preparation activities. All echelons refine their plans in parallel.

8-63. A thorough rehearsal contributes to effective execution. At tactical levels, rehearsals usually take place on prominent terrain overlooking the defensive area, with a terrain model or a map. At the operational level, they involve simulations and command post exercises. Such rehearsals preceded
Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield, and Uphold Democracy. Joint exercises are often operational-level rehearsals. Rehearsals allow subordinate commanders and staffs to review what they are required to do and when. They aid mutual understanding and promote synchronized actions. Rehearsals permit adjustments to the plan and refinement of responsibilities for actions and contingencies at critical points in the operation.

8-64. The most important preparation activities include—

- Conducting rehearsals.
- Developing engagement areas.
- Executing shaping IO, including military deception operations.
- Taking force protection measures, to include strengthening air and missile defenses of critical assets.
- Executing security operations.
- Conducting reconnaissance and surveillance missions to collect information on the enemy and AO.
- Preparing reserves.
- Designating counterattack forces.
- Organizing the force for movement and support.
- Positioning forces in depth.
- Improving terrain to favor the defender.

EXECUTING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

8-65. Commanders consider several factors as they exercise battle command during defensive operations. Army forces conduct operations in depth; commanders consider how best to employ their force throughout the AO. Defending in depth may result in enemy penetrations or parts of the force becoming encircled; commanders visualize how to deal with these situations. Elements of the force conduct sustaining operations throughout the AO; commanders make provisions for protecting them. If WMD are present, commanders prepare the force to counter their effects. Finally, commanders visualize how they will use a counterattack to terminate the defense and transition to offensive operations.

Battle Command

8-66. Commanders position themselves at the critical place at the critical time. In the defense, this may include moving with the counterattacking force or locating with the committed reserve. Commanders should anticipate and provide for the means to exercise C2 on the move.

Operations in Depth

8-67. In both area and mobile defenses, commanders direct simultaneous operations in depth to ensure success of the decisive operation. Simultaneous shaping operations throughout the AO limit enemy options, disrupt his synchronization and affect follow-on element arrival times. Reconnaissance, surveillance, security, air elements, and special operations forces all have roles in the defense. As attackers approach, these forces monitor their activities
Defensive Operations

and track committed units. They determine the avenues of approach being used, identify the greatest threat, and gain time for the main body to act.

Enemy Penetrations

8-68. Commanders use all available means to contain or destroy enemy penetrations. In an area defense, commanders block and eliminate penetrations as quickly as possible. In a mobile defense, commanders may allow a significant penetration to position attackers for destruction by the striking force. Commanders shift their main effort to counter enemy actions and create conditions that favor the decisive operation. This may require adjusting boundaries, repeatedly committing and reconstituting reserves, and executing branches to the original plan.

Encirclements and Breakouts

8-69. Units may be unintentionally cut off from friendly forces. In that case, the senior commander among the encircled units assumes control of all encircled elements and assesses the defensive posture of the force. The commander rapidly reorganizes, consolidates, and determines whether the next higher commander wants the force to break out or defend in place. If the force can break out and that action meets the higher commander’s intent, it does so before the enemy has time to block escape routes.

8-70. To break out, the commander designates or organizes a force to create a penetration toward other friendly forces while the other encircled units continue defending. When the penetration is created, the defending units break contact and follow the attacking unit to rejoin friendly forces. If the force cannot break out, it continues to defend while the commander coordinates a linkup with a relieving force.

Protecting Sustaining Operations

8-71. Uninterrupted sustaining operations ensure freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations. Threats to sustaining operations may require forces and facilities to reposition. Response forces from CSS and CS units are responsible for countering threats from small tactical units. When response forces are insufficient, commanders may commit a TCF (see FM 3-90; FM 3-100.7). Because threats to sustaining operations can divert combat power from the decisive operation, commanders carefully weigh the need for such diversions against the possible consequences and decide where to accept risk.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

8-72. When present in the theater of operations, WMD present a major threat. These weapons can completely destroy the strongest defensive positions as well as obstruct maneuver. In situations where WMD may be used, commanders take both offensive and defensive actions. They attack enemy WMD C2, delivery systems, and storage areas. They protect the force through dispersion, theater missile defense, survivability positions, and individual protective measures. Commanders also adjust their operations and tactics. They fight from dispersed locations and concentrate their forces only as needed to mass the effects of fires.
Counterattacks

8-73. Counterattacks seek to wrest the initiative from the attacker. Timing is critical. Executed too soon, a counterattack may expend resources needed later for a more urgent contingency. Executed too late, it may be ineffective.

8-74. Commanders anticipate circumstances that favor counterattacks and establish information requirements that help them determine when those circumstances occur. To make these decisions wisely, commanders require relevant information about both friendly and enemy forces. Errors in computing movement and deployment times can upset the timing of the counterattack. Late or inaccurate reports about attackers can lead to executing too soon or too late. Training and experience, combined with effective information management, give commanders the relevant information needed to make the right decisions.

Terminating the Defense

8-75. Attackers culminate through friction caused by their own maneuvers, losses, errors, exhaustion, skillful friendly defenses, and other factors. At that point, the initiative passes to the defender. Commanders then designate a counterattack as the decisive operation, finish destroying the enemy force, and transition to the offense.

THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

8-76. Improved technology provides commanders increased flexibility for defensive operations. The fusion of information from C2, ISR, fire support, and CSS systems—combined with the commander’s judgment—allows commanders to understand their battlespace and conduct fluid noncontiguous operations from widely dispersed locations. A COP based on this fused information helps commanders make better and quicker decisions. The increasing range and precision of direct and indirect fires allow Army forces to weaken attackers and shape the situation before entering close combat. Improved C2 and ISR systems allow commanders to disperse their forces without losing the ability to mass effects at the decisive time and place. Dispersed Army forces present tactical challenges to attackers. If attackers disperse their forces, they expose themselves to swift concentration of more mobile friendly forces. If attackers concentrate against a portion of the friendly force, the remaining friendly units maneuver in depth to isolate the enemy force and destroy it. Modern technology provides the means to conduct more flexible and deadly defensive operations than ever before. Trained soldiers and decisive leaders apply those means in uncertain situations to defeat enemies and transition to offensive operations that achieve the desired end state.
Chapter 9

Stability Operations

To defend and protect US national interests, our national military objectives are to Promote Peace and Stability and, when necessary, to Defeat Adversaries. US Armed Forces advance national security by applying military power as directed to help Shape the international environment and Respond to the full spectrum of crises, while we also Prepare Now for an uncertain future.

The National Military Strategy
1997

9-1. Combatant commanders employ Army forces in stability operations outside the US and US territories to promote and protect US national interests. Army forces are trained, equipped, and organized to control land, populations, and situations for extended periods. The depth and breadth of Army force capabilities provide combatant commanders important, flexible options to meet theater operational requirements.

9-2. Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment. They include developmental, cooperative activities during peacetime and coercive actions in response to crisis. Army forces accomplish stability goals through engagement and response. The military activities that support stability operations are diverse, continuous, and often long-term. Their purpose is to promote and sustain regional and global stability.

9-3. Although Army forces focus on warfighting, their history and current commitments include many stability operations. Even during major theater wars, Army forces conduct stability operations. These occur during combat operations and throughout the postconflict period. The US strategy of promoting regional stability by encouraging security and prosperity means Army forces will be engaged in stability operations for the foreseeable future.
ENGAGEMENT AND RESPONSE

9-4. Engagement occurs in the context of the combatant commander’s theater strategy (see Figure 9-1). Combatant commanders continually employ military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. Theater engagement plans (TEPs) provide frameworks within which combatant commands engage regional partners in cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, TEP activities remedy the causes of crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive US military intervention.

PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

9-5. Combatant commanders shape their areas of responsibility through peacetime military engagement (PME). *Peacetime military engagement* encompasses all military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. It includes programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual understanding with other countries, and improve interoperability with
treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Peacetime military engagement activities are designed to support a combatant commander’s objectives as articulated in the theater engagement plan. Combatant commanders synchronize their TEPs with country plans (prepared by US ambassadors) and internal defense and development strategies that support theater objectives. Army forces contribute to all three, usually as partners with host nation forces and in coordination with civil agencies.

9-6. Many countries do not invest in air and sea forces. However, almost all countries have armies or land-based paramilitary or police forces. Therefore, Army forces are ideally suited for PME with host nation land forces. Army forces are equally suited for contacting and positively influencing host nation civilian populations. The objectives of PME are to—

- Open communications.
- Increase interoperability.
- Foster regional military professionalism.
- Demonstrate by example the role of the military in a democracy.

Reciprocal military-to-military contact is the primary method of executing PME. Examples include multinational training exercises, joint contact team programs, individual training exchanges, medical and engineer projects and exercises, and staff information exchanges. The reciprocity concept means all sides—US forces, host nation forces, and international partners—benefit.

9-7. Although developmental in nature, PME activities promote regional stability. They are conducted (planned, prepared, executed, and assessed) like other stability operations. However, PME uses only cooperative actions to accomplish combatant commander objectives. Successful PME activities preclude US forces from having to conduct coercive stability operations.

RESPONSE

9-8. When crises develop and the National Command Authorities (NCA) direct, combatant commanders respond. If the crisis revolves around external threats to a regional partner, combatant commanders employ Army forces to deter aggression and signal US commitment. Deploying Army forces to train in Kuwait is an example of this sort of response. If the crisis is caused by an internal conflict that threatens regional stability, US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability. Operation Restore Democracy, the 1994 intervention in Haiti, is an example. In other cases, regional stability requires Army force presence to guarantee postconflict agreements. Ongoing operations in the Sinai and Bosnia exemplify this sort of stability operation. Stability operations that respond to crises are smaller-scale contingencies and may include both developmental and coercive actions. Developmental actions enhance a host government’s willingness and ability to care for its people. Coercive actions apply carefully prescribed force or the threat of force to change the security environment.

Rapid Response and Preclusion

9-9. A critical component of successful stability operations is the ability to rapidly respond in the early stages of an imminent or ongoing crisis. Prompt deployment of sufficient forces in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the
need to deploy larger forces later. Effective intervention can also deny adversaries time to set conditions in their favor or accomplish destabilizing objectives. Deploying a credible force rapidly is the initial step in precluding or blocking aggression. However, deployment alone will not guarantee success. Achieving successful preclusion involves convincing the adversary that the deployed force is able to conduct decisive offensive and defensive operations.

Presence and Deterrence

9-10. Sustained Army force presence promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic and economic programs designed to reduce the causes of instability can flourish. Presence can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. Army forces can establish and maintain a credible presence as long as the NCA direct. Army force presence, as part of a TEP, often keeps unstable situations from escalating into war.

9-11. Army forces are the cornerstone of theater deterrence. The sustained presence of strong, capable ground forces is the most visible sign of US commitment—to allies and adversaries alike. However, if deterrence fails, committed forces must be agile enough to transition to combat operations. Ideally, deterrent forces should be able to conduct decisive operations immediately. However, if committed forces lack the combat power to conduct decisive operations, they conduct shaping operations while additional forces deploy.

Ongoing Deterrence—Forward Presence in Korea

The demilitarized zone that separates the Republic of Korea from North Korea remains the most densely armed space in the world. As part of a joint and multinational team, Army forces maintain stability through forward presence. To deter aggression, Republic of Korea and US forces prepare to fight and defeat any North Korean attack. Army forces include a numbered army headquarters with active and reserve component representatives, an infantry division, two aviation brigades, a Patriot air defense artillery battalion, and combat support and combat service support units. Annually, during exercise Ulchi Focus Lens, ROK and US forces use enhanced simulation methods to rehearse the theater defense campaign plan. Commanders and staffs have the opportunity to practice integrating forward-based forces with reinforcing units. Through forward presence, Army forces in Korea represent US intentions to deter war.

CHARACTERISTICS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

9-12. Army forces conduct stability operations in a dynamic environment. Stability operations are normally nonlinear and often conducted in noncontiguous areas of operations (AOs). They are often time- and manpower-intensive. Commanders analyze each mission and adapt the operational framework, elements of operational design, and factors of METT-TC to fit the situation. They often use logical lines of operation to visualize an operation and describe it in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. However, determining the military actions necessary to achieve the desired
political end state can be more challenging than in situations requiring offensive and defensive operations; achieving the end state may be just as difficult.

9-13. During all operations, commanders constantly assess the situation in terms of the application and interrelation of the factors of METT-TC. However, stability operations often require commanders to apply METT-TC differently than they would when conducting offensive and defensive operations. The “enemy,” for example, may be a set of ambiguous threats and potential adversaries. Even the mission may change as the situation becomes less or more stable. A mission can be as simple as conducting a briefing to host nation forces in a military-to-military-exchange or as difficult as conducting combat operations to accomplish a peace enforcement mission. Stability may be threatened for a number of reasons, and an enemy may be difficult to define or isolate. Depending upon the progress of the operation, the complexity of the mission may change quickly.

9-14. Different factors may be important when analyzing the terrain and the troops and support available in stability operations. What constitutes key terrain may be based more on political and social considerations than physical features of the landscape. The troops assigned or available to a commander could include nontraditional assets, such as host nation police units, contracted interpreters and laborers, or multinational forces. The level of integration and cohesion of a force composed of diverse assets is a key consideration for mission success.

9-15. Time considerations normally are substantially different in stability operations. The goals of a stability operation may not be achievable in the short term. Success often requires perseverance, a long-term commitment to solving the real problem. The achievement of these goals may take years. Conversely, daily operations may require rapid responses to changing conditions based on unanticipated localized conflict among competing groups. Civil considerations are especially critical in stability operations. The civil population, host nation government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations can greatly affect achieving stability.

9-16. Stability operations are inherently complex and place great demands on small units. Small unit leaders are required to develop interpersonal skills—such as cultural awareness, negotiating techniques, and critical language phrases—while maintaining warfighting skills. They must also remain calm and exercise good judgment under considerable pressure. Soldiers and units at every level must be flexible and adaptive. Often, stability operations require leaders with the mental and physical agility to shift from noncombat to combat operations and back again.

9-17. Stability operations help restore law and order in unstable areas outside of the US and its territories. However, the mere presence of Army forces does not guarantee stability. Offensive and defensive operations may be necessary to defeat enemies that oppose a stability operation. The ability of Army forces to stabilize a crisis is directly related to their perceived ability to attack and defend as necessary.
TYPES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

9-18. Army forces may conduct stability operations before hostilities, in crises, during hostilities, and after hostilities. Before hostilities, stability operations focus on deterring or preempting conflict. In a crisis, they may resolve a potential conflict or prevent escalation. During hostilities, they can help keep armed conflict from spreading and assist and encourage partners. Following hostilities, stability operations can provide a secure environment that allows civil authorities to reassume control. Army forces conduct 10 types of stability operations.

Peace Operations

PEACE OPERATIONS

9-19. Peace operations (PO) encompass peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement (PEO) operations conducted to support diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace (see JP 3-07.3; FM 3-07.3). Army forces conduct PO to support strategic and policy objectives and their implementing diplomatic activities. Although the US reserves the right to conduct PO unilaterally, it will normally participate in PO under the sponsorship of the United Nations (UN) or another multinational organization.

9-20. As in other operations, commanders and staffs should continually assess the operation and prepare contingency plans. In PO, planning for possible or likely transitions is especially important. Examples include transitioning from a US unilateral operation or multinational coalition to a UN-led coalition, from combat to noncombat operations, and from military to civilian control. Optimally, Army forces should not transition from one PO role to another unless there is a change of mandate or a political decision with appropriate adjustments to force structure, rules of engagement (ROE), and other aspects of the mission.

Peacekeeping Operations

9-21. PKO are undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute. They are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of cease fire, truce, or other such agreements, and to support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlements (see JP 3-07.3; FM 3-07; FM 3-07.3). The ongoing multinational force observer operation in the Sinai Peninsula is an example of a successful PKO. PKO usually involve observing, monitoring, or supervising and assisting parties to a dispute. To achieve objectives, Army forces conducting PKO rely on the legitimacy acknowledged by all major belligerents and international or regional organizations. They use or threaten force only in self-defense or as a last resort. Information superiority is extremely important during PKO. Information superiority supports force protection, situational understanding, and subordinate PKO-related efforts.
Stability Mission at Brcko

On 28 August 1997, US soldiers demonstrated considerable restraint during riots at Brcko, Bosnia. Early that day, forces loyal to Bosnian President Biljana Plavsic attempted to take control of local police stations and media centers. In the process, they clashed with supporters of suspected war criminal Radovan Karadzic. Soldiers from Task Force (TF) Eagle, part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Stabilization Force, arrived on the scene to preempt violence and protect UN civilian agencies and international police. While Karadzic’s supporters looted the UN police station, other rioters assaulted International Police Task Force (IPTF) members and damaged 100 UN vehicles. The soldiers quickly moved through the agitated crowd to protect IPTF officers and UN property. The pro-Karadzic crowd surrounded the soldiers, threatening to kill them for allegedly taking sides with President Plavsic. Rioters attacked US soldiers with Molotov cocktails, nail-studded boards, rocks, and bricks. They broke the nose of one soldier and stabbed another in the arm. Army leaders ordered their soldiers not to fire on the frenzied crowd. Instead, Stabilization Force helicopters dropped tear gas to disperse the rioters. US forces then secured the wounded soldiers and police officers. The well-trained soldiers and leaders of TF Eagle exhibited disciplined, appropriate restraint under politically charged circumstances.

Peace Enforcement Operations

9-22. PEO apply military force, or threaten its use—normally pursuant to international authorization—to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Unlike PKO, PEO do not require the consent of all parties. PEO maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia during 1992-93 was a peace enforcement operation. Army forces assigned a peace enforcement mission must be able to apply sufficient combat power for self-defense and to forcibly accomplish assigned tasks. Units must also be prepared to transition to PKO. PEO normally include one or more of six subordinate operations:

- Forcible separation of belligerents.
- Establishment and supervision of protected areas.
- Sanction and exclusion zone enforcement.
- Movement denial and guarantee.
- Restoration and maintenance of order.
- Protection of humanitarian assistance.

Operations in Support of Diplomatic Efforts

9-23. Army forces support diplomatic efforts to establish peace and order before, during, and after conflicts. These operations include preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building (see JP 3-07.3). For example, Army forces support preventive diplomacy by conducting preventive deployments or shows of force as part of efforts to deter conflict. Support to peacemaking operations often includes military-to-military contacts, exercises, peacetime...
deployments, and security assistance. Army forces support to *peace building* involves the same activities as longer-term foreign internal defense (FID) operations. Military support of diplomatic activities improves the chances for success by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating the resolve to achieve viable political settlements.

**FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE**

9-24. FID is participation by civilian and military agencies of one government in programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (see JP 3-07.1; FM 3-07). It involves all elements of national power and can occur across the range of military operations. FID is a primary program that supports friendly nations operating against or threatened by hostile elements. It promotes stability by helping a host nation establish and preserve institutions and facilities responsive to its people's needs. Army forces participating in FID normally advise and assist host nation forces conducting operations. FID is also a specified and significant mission for selected Army special operations forces (ARSOF) (see FM 3-05). However, FID requires joint planning, preparation, and execution to ensure the efforts of all service and functional components are mutually supportive and focused. The categories of FID operations are—

- Indirect support.
- Direct support (not involving combat operations).
- Combat operations to support host nation efforts.

**Indirect Support**

9-25. Indirect support emphasizes host nation self-sufficiency and builds strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities. Examples include security assistance programs, multinational exercises, and exchange programs. Indirect support reinforces host government legitimacy and primacy in addressing internal problems (see JP 3-07.1).

**Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations)**

9-26. Direct support (not involving combat operations) uses US forces to provide direct assistance to the host nation civilian populace or military. Direct support includes civil-military operations (CMO), intelligence and communications sharing, and logistics. Direct support does not usually involve transferring arms and equipment, or training local military forces (see JP 3-07.1).

**Combat Operations**

9-27. Combat operations include offensive and defensive operations conducted by US forces to support a host nation fight against insurgents or terrorists. Normally, using US forces in combat operations is a temporary measure. FID operations are closely scrutinized by a variety of audiences, to include the American public, international organizations, and the host nation populace. Hostile propaganda will attempt to exploit the presence of foreign troops to discredit the host government and the US. Poorly executed, direct involvement by the US military can damage the legitimacy and credibility of the host government and host nation security forces. Eventually host nation forces must stabilize the situation and provide security for the populace.
9-28. Most FID activities focus on helping a host nation prevent an active insurgency from developing. If an insurgency already exists or preventive measures fail, FID focuses on eliminating, marginalizing, or reassimilating insurgent elements. The US provides military support to counterinsurgency efforts, recognizing that military power alone cannot achieve lasting success. US military power cannot, and will not, ensure the survival of regimes that fail to meet their people’s basic needs. Military programs and US actions promote a secure environment in which to implement programs that eliminate causes of insurgencies and encourage insurgents to rejoin civil society. As with other FID actions, support to a counterinsurgency balances security with economic development to enhance or reestablish stability.

9-29. Army forces conduct support to counterinsurgencies within the context of the US ambassador’s country plan and the host nation’s internal defense and development strategy. The goal is to integrate all resources—civilian and military, public and private—so that host nation combat operations and development efforts complement each other. The intended result is measurable improvement in the economic, social, and political well-being of those supported. Army forces can also assist in development programs by helping governmental and private agencies provide essential supplies and services.

9-30. Support to counterinsurgencies helps host governments deal with two principal groups: the insurgents and the people. Army forces help host governments protect the people from insurgent violence and separate them from insurgent control. These actions require persuasion, prosecution, and destruction to attack insurgent leadership and organization. The goal is to deny insurgent organizations sources of personnel, materiel, funds, and intelligence. The fundamental cause of insurgent activities is widespread dissatisfaction with standing ethnic, religious, political, social, or economic conditions by some sizable portion of the population. For US military power to be effective in supporting a counterinsurgency, the host government must address or revise its policies toward the disaffected portions of the population. There are few immediate, decisive results in military operations against insurgent forces. When results occur, they are short lived unless the host government acts just as decisively to address the problems that underlie the insurgency.

9-31. Army forces help the host government police, paramilitary, and military forces perform counterinsurgency, area security, or local security operations. They provide advice and assistance in finding, dispersing, capturing, and destroying insurgent forces. Army forces emphasize training national, state, and local forces to perform essential defense functions. Their aim is to provide a secure environment in which development programs can take effect, while respecting the rights and dignity of the people.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

9-32. Security assistance refers to a group of programs that support US national policies and objectives by providing defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales. Examples of US security assistance programs are Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, the Economic Support Fund, and Arms Export Control Act-licensed commercial sales. Army forces support security assistance efforts through
military training teams, maintenance support personnel and training, and related activities such as humanitarian demining operations.

**Foreign Internal Defense in El Salvador**

From 1979 until the early 1990s, the US recognized Central America as a region of primary security interest. US representatives sought to create lasting democratic change by assisting Latin American countries to revamp domestic policies, processes, and institutions through diplomatic, economic, and military influence. The Reagan administration used diplomacy and economic aid to promote democratic elections, initiate social and economic reforms, and end human rights abuses. A US military group assisted the El Salvadoran army by establishing a facility for basic and advanced military training. The advisors, primarily ARSOF, also served with El Salvadoran units to support small unit training and logistics. The advisors helped the El Salvadoran military become more professional and better organized while advising in the conduct of pacification and counterguerrilla operations against the communist-backed Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front. Army forces supported US interests by creating a crack counterinsurgency force that fought the guerillas to a standstill and established the groundwork for a negotiated settlement.

**HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE**

9-33. Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs consist of assistance provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises. By law (Title 10 US Code, section 401), HCA are authorized by the secretary of state and planned and appropriated in the Army budget. HCA must enhance the security interests of both the US and host nation and increase the operational readiness of the units and soldiers performing the mission. In contrast to humanitarian and disaster relief conducted under foreign humanitarian assistance operations, HCA are planned activities with specific budget limitations. HCA are limited to the following categories:

- Medical, dental, and veterinary care for rural areas of a country.
- Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
- Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
- Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
- Specified activities related to mine detection and clearance, including education, training, and technical assistance.

**SUPPORT TO INSURGENCIES**

9-34. On NCA order, Army forces support insurgencies that oppose regimes that threaten US interests or regional stability. While any Army force can be tasked to support an insurgency, ARSOF usually receive these missions. ARSOF training, organization, and regional focus make them well suited for these operations. Army forces supporting insurgencies may provide logistic and training support but normally do not conduct combat operations.
SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

9-35. In 1986, the president issued National Security Decision Directive 221 declaring drug trafficking a threat to national security. It is also a threat to the stability of many friendly nations. The Army participates in counterdrug operations under provisions of the national drug control strategy. Army forces may be employed in various operations to support other agencies responsible for detecting, disrupting, interdicting, and destroying illicit drugs and the infrastructure (personnel, materiel, and distribution systems) of illicit drug trafficking entities (see JP 3-07.4).

9-36. Army forces always conduct counterdrug operations in support of other US government agencies. These include the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Department of State, Drug Enforcement Agency, and Border Patrol. When conducted inside the US and its territories, they are domestic support operations. When conducted outside the US and its territories, counterdrug operations are considered stability operations. Army forces do not engage in direct action during counterdrug operations. Units that support counterdrug operations comply with US and foreign legal limitations concerning the acquisition of information on civilians and the conduct of law enforcement activities.

COMBATTING TERRORISM

9-37. Terrorism is the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear. It is intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies. Terrorists usually pursue political, religious, or ideological goals. Enemies who cannot compete with Army forces conventionally often turn to terrorist tactics. Terrorist attacks often create a disproportionate effect on even the most capable conventional forces. Terrorist tactics from arson to employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Army forces routinely conduct operations to deter or defeat these attacks. Offensively oriented operations are categorized as counterterrorism; defensively oriented operations are antiterrorism.

Counterterrorism

9-38. Counterterrorism is offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Army forces participate in the full array of counterterrorism actions, including strikes and raids against terrorist organizations and
facilities outside the US and its territories. Counterterrorism is a specified mission for selected special operations forces that operate under direct control of the NCA or under a combatant command arrangement. Commanders who employ conventional forces against organized terrorist forces operating inside their AO are conducting conventional offensive operations, not counterterrorism operations.

Antiterrorism

9-39. Antiterrorism is defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist attacks, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Antiterrorism is a consideration for all forces during all types of military operations. Acts of terrorism against US forces may have a strategic impact (see JP 3-07.2; FM 3-07.2). Commanders take the security measures necessary to accomplish the mission and protect the force against terrorism. Soldiers are often most vulnerable during off-duty periods and in recreational locations. Soldiers and families that reside outside protected installations are ideal targets for terrorists. Commanders make every reasonable effort to minimize the vulnerability of their force to murder and hostage taking. Typical antiterrorism actions include—

- Coordinating with local law enforcement.
- Positioning and hardening of facilities.
- Taking physical security actions designed to prevent unauthorized access or approach to facilities.
- Taking crime prevention and physical security actions that prevent theft of weapons, munitions, identification cards, and other materials.
- Establishing policies regarding travel, size of convoys, breaking of routines, host nation interaction, and off-duty restrictions.
- Providing for protection from WMD.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

9-40. Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) relocate threatened civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign nation to secure areas (see JP 3-07.5). Normally, these operations involve US citizens whose lives are in danger either from the threat of hostilities or from a natural disaster. They may also include host nation citizens and third country nationals. Army forces, normally as part of a joint task force, conduct NEOs to assist and support the Department of State. Removing noncombatant Americans and others from the threat of being killed or taken hostage provides humanitarian service. Relocating these potential targets expands options available to diplomatic and military authorities.

9-41. NEOs take place in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments. Ambassadors may initiate a NEO in a permissive environment in anticipation of a crisis. Direct military involvement in these evacuations is usually not required. NEOs supported by the military are normally initiated when the local situation has deteriorated, and the security of the evacuees is uncertain or the environment is hostile. These types of NEOs are usually conducted with minimal warning. Often American lives are in immediate danger.
9-42. NEOs can be conducted as a prelude to combat actions, as part of deterrent actions, or as part of a PO. Most often, evacuation force commanders have little influence over the local situation. They may not have the authority to use military measures to preempt hostile actions, yet must be prepared to protect the evacuees and defend the force. The imminent threat may come from hostile forces, general lawlessness, dangerous environmental conditions, or a combination of all three. Correctly appraising the threat and the political-military environment in which forces operate is key to NEO planning.

ARMS CONTROL

9-43. Army forces normally conduct arms control operations to support arms control treaties and enforcement agencies. Army forces can assist in locating, seizing, and destroying WMD after hostilities, as occurred after Operation Desert Storm. Other actions include escorting deliveries of weapons and material (such as enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use, inspecting and monitoring production and storage facilities, and training foreign forces to secure weapons and facilities.

9-44. Army forces may conduct arms control to prevent escalation of a conflict and reduce instability. This can include mandated disarming of belligerents as part of a PO. Collecting, storing, and destroying conventional munitions and weapons systems can deter belligerents from resuming hostilities. Some Army force capabilities, including engineering and explosive ordinance disposal, are well suited to these operations.

SHOW OF FORCE

9-45. The US conducts shows of force for three reasons: to bolster and reassure allies, deter potential aggressors, and gain or increase influence. These shows of force are designated as flexible deterrent options. Shows of force are designed to demonstrate a credible and specific threat to an aggressor or potential aggressor. The presence of powerful and capable forces signals to potential aggressors the political will to use force. Combatant commanders may establish force deployment options in contingency plans.

Conventional Arms Control Operations—Task Force Eagle in Bosnia

During implementation and sustainment force operations in Bosnia, Army forces belonging to Task Force Eagle and operating under the authority of the Dayton Accords performed arms control operations. Soldiers monitored and inspected numerous weapons storage sites throughout the Task Force Eagle AO to ensure compliance with Annex 1A and its stipulations that the parties withdraw weapons and forces to cantonments and barracks areas.

A show of force is an operation designed to demonstrate US resolve, which involves increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation, that if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives.
9-46. For Army forces, show of force operations usually involve the deployment or buildup of forces, an increase in readiness and activity of designated forces, or a demonstration of operational capabilities by forces already in the region. An effective show of force must be demonstrably mission capable and sustainable. Although actual combat is not desired, shows of force can rapidly and unexpectedly escalate. Units assigned show of force missions assume that combat is probable and prepare accordingly. All actions ordinarily associated with the projection of a force to conduct combat operations pertain to show of force deployments.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

9-47. Conducting stability operations is identical to conducting offensive, defensive, and support operations. While each stability operation is different, the visualize-describe-direct process, military decision making process, and troop leading procedures apply. The following considerations supplement those processes and help commanders develop tailored concepts and schemes for stability operations.

LEVERAGE INTERAGENCY, JOINT, AND MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION

9-48. Unity of effort requires constant coordination with all involved agencies. Stability operations require commanders to adapt to situations where lines of authority and areas of responsibility are unclear. This is important because the military is often the supporting rather than the supported agency. Commanders coordinate and integrate civilian and military activities. Likewise, commanders make their military objectives and operational schemes clear to other agencies. Coordination makes unity of effort and effective integration work in environments where unity of command is not possible. It also lends coherence to the activities of the elements involved.

9-49. Operational and tactical headquarters plan their operations to complement those of governmental and private agencies. Coordinating centers such as civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) accomplish this task. CMOCs include representatives from as many agencies as required. Effective civil-military coordination and cooperation is necessary to mass the effects of all assets, agencies, and forces to accomplish national and multinational objectives. Effective CMO reduce the use of US resources through coordination with host and third nation governmental organizations, NGOs, and international organizations operating in the AO (see JP 3-57; FM 3-57).
ENHANCE THE CAPABILITIES AND LEGITIMACY OF THE HOST NATION

9-50. Army forces consciously endeavor to enhance host nation credibility and legitimacy. They demonstrate the proper respect for host nation government, police, and military forces. Host nation military and police forces are integrated into all aspects of every operation. The civil population will closely watch actions by Army forces. Disrespect toward host nation officials or lack of confidence in host nation capabilities by US forces will discredit the host nation and damage the stability effort.

9-51. Commanders must not allow stability issue solutions to become a US responsibility. Within their capabilities, the host nation must take the lead, in both developmental and security activities. When host nation capabilities are inadequate, Army forces enhance them through training, advice, and assistance. Commanders, within the restrictions of international law and US policy, make maximum use of host nation forces and personnel. In any successful stability operation, the host nation—not the US forces supporting it—must ultimately prevail.

9-52. For many stability operations, success demands a long-term investment. Factors that lead to instability or insurgency compound over time. The host nation and its supporters cannot expect to quickly correct years of problems and their consequences. The affected segments of society must see that changes are lasting and underlying problems are being effectively addressed.

UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL FOR UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL UNIT ACTIONS

9-53. Given the volatile and politically charged nature of most stability operations, individual and small unit actions can have consequences disproportionate to the level of command or amount of force involved. In some cases, tactical operations and individual actions can have strategic effects. Recognizing and avoiding potential problems requires trained, disciplined, and knowledgeable leaders and soldiers at every level. Every soldier must understand the operational and strategic context of the mission and the potential military, political, and legal consequences of their actions or inaction.

9-54. Stability operations occur in the public view. This includes continuous observation by host nation, domestic, and international populations as well as the media. Knowing this, opponents of stability efforts will seize on relatively minor incidents to achieve strategic advantages. Potentially, a single act of indiscriminate or rash application of force can undo months and years of disciplined effort. Likewise, actions that are destructive to the natural or cultural environment may introduce negative perceptions that must be overcome.

DISPLAY THE CAPABILITY TO USE FORCE IN A NONTHREATENING MANNER

9-55. Army forces conducting stability operations must be capable of limited combat operations for self-defense. A corollary to being prepared to conduct offensive and defensive operations is the need to display such preparedness in a nonthreatening manner. The intent is to demonstrate strength and resolve without provoking an unintended response. For example, the aim of a show of force is deterrence, not goading or bullying an adversary into an attack.
9-56. Within mission constraints, units display preparedness by routinely conducting combat training. Training should challenge soldiers with situations involving weapons use, levels of force, and ROE. Consistent with operations security demands, commanders make known to all parties the breadth and depth of available resources. It is not prudent to inform potential adversaries of all available Army force capabilities. However, displaying offensive and defensive strength can deter some adversaries from direct confrontation.

**Vietnam—A Case Study in US Military Involvement**

Direct US involvement in Vietnam began in 1954, when the US military assistance advisory group there received French permission to assist in training South Vietnamese soldiers. Over time, US advisors gradually increased their training role. The Americans assumed fuller control over Vietnamese military affairs, transforming the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) into a US-style force. Vietnamese exercises ended with regimental and division maneuvers, training that removed soldiers from fighting the insurgency. In 1956 the French left Vietnam, and the US continued to emphasize conventional warfighting methods. Special Forces worked with the local populace while conventional US forces increased their influence over the ARVN with the creation of Military Assistance Command–Vietnam. In 1965, the war escalated and US forces assumed greater responsibility for military operations. The majority of South Vietnamese people came to rely on US forces for their protection, eroding their confidence in their own government to provide for their security. US forces intended to support the South Vietnamese, but by significantly increasing their role in defending Vietnam, they undermined Vietnamese government authority and ARVN credibility.

**ACT DECISIVELY TO PREVENT ESCALATION**

9-57. The nature of stability operations may limit the ways and means available to accomplish military objectives. Operational restraints do not necessarily impede the effectiveness of an Army force. Army forces act with speed and determination. Adversaries may perceive hesitation as weakness. Being overcautious can also damage the confidence of the uncommitted populations in the stability effort. Army forces must pursue military objectives energetically and, when necessary, apply military power forcefully. This does not imply that soldiers act with belligerence. Rather, in cases where force is required, commanders ensure that it is applied rapidly and decisively in a manner calculated to end the crisis and deter future confrontations.

**APPLY FORCE SELECTIVELY AND DISCRIMINATELY**

9-58. An extension of the need to act decisively is the requirement to apply force selectively. Commanders ensure their units apply force in a manner consistent with and adequate to their objectives. They employ combat power appropriate to the mission within prescribed legal and policy limitations. Commanders consider requirements to prevent unnecessary suffering, distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, and minimize the loss of life and damage to property. These considerations constrain or dictate the level of force acceptable. Excessive or arbitrary use of force is never justified.
It may lead to the need to apply ever increasing force to maintain the same degree of order as well as to the loss of sympathy and support of the local populace.

9-59. Conversely, using inadequate force jeopardizes force credibility. Inadequate force emboldens potential adversaries and raises doubts in the minds of protected groups. Operational commanders issue ROE to guide tactical application of combat power. Ordinarily, the commander on the ground is best qualified to determine the required degree of force, consistent with the ROE.

9-60. When available, nonlethal capabilities can provide additional tools to augment, but not replace, the traditional means of deadly force. Nonlethal means expand the number of options for confronting situations where deadly force is not warranted. However, each soldier must retain the capability to immediately apply deadly force for self-defense.
Chapter 10
Support Operations

Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create a political committee, a civil military operations center, to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or fire support operations center.

Lieutenant General A. C. Zinni, USMC
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force

10-1. Support operations use Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crises and relieve suffering. In support operations, Army forces provide essential support, services, assets, or specialized resources to help civil authorities deal with situations beyond their capabilities. The purpose of support operations is to meet the immediate needs of designated groups for a limited time, until civil authorities can do so without Army assistance. In extreme or exceptional cases, Army forces may provide relief or assistance directly to those in need. More commonly, Army forces help civil authorities or nongovernmental organizations provide support. Army forces often conduct support operations as stand-alone missions. However, most offensive, defensive, and stability operations require complementary support operations before, during, and after execution.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

10-2. Support operations are usually nonlinear and noncontiguous. Leaders tailor the application of the operational framework, elements of operational design, and METT-TC to fit each situation. Commanders designate the decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations necessary for mission success. However, identifying centers of gravity, decisive points—and even the desired end state—can be more complex and unorthodox than in offensive and defensive operations. When visualizing a support operation, commanders recognize that they may have to define the enemy differently. In support operations, the adversary is often disease, hunger, or the consequences of disaster.
TYPES OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

10-3. The two types of support operations are domestic support operations (DSO) and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). Army forces conduct DSO within, and FHA outside, the US and its territories. Army forces have broader requirements and more significant and extensive obligations in DSO than FHA. Army forces normally conduct FHA operations only in permissive environments. In uncertain and hostile environments, Army forces conduct FHA operations as part of larger stability, offensive, or defensive operations.

Domestic support operations are those activities and measures taken by DOD to foster mutual assistance and support between DOD and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies.

DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS

10-4. Army support to DSO supplements the efforts and resources of state and local governments and organizations. A presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency usually precedes DSO. DSO require extensive coordination and liaison among many organizations—interagency, joint, active component (AC), and reserve component (RC)—as well as with state and local governments. The Federal Response Plan provides a national-level architecture to coordinate the actions of all supporting federal agencies.

10-5. Under the Constitution, civil authorities are responsible for preserving public order and carrying out governmental operations within their jurisdictions—using force if necessary. The Constitution allows the use of Army forces to protect the states against invasion and, upon request of a state, to protect it against domestic violence. Army forces—under joint command—provide the nation with critical capabilities, such as missile defense, necessary to secure and defend the homeland. However, the amended Posse Comitatus Act significantly restricts using federal military forces, to include federalized RC soldiers and units, in law enforcement. It prescribes criminal penalties for using the Army or Air Force to execute laws or to perform civilian law enforcement functions within the US, except as otherwise authorized by the Constitution or Congress. DOD policy extends this prohibition to the Navy and Marine Corps. The Stafford Act also defines and clarifies the role of US military forces in support of domestic civil authorities. Since the law may prohibit certain types of activities during DSO, commanders need a detailed analysis of their legal authorities for each mission.

10-6. The primary reference for military assistance to civil authorities (MACA) is DODD 3025.15. It is wide-ranging, addressing such actions as civil disturbance control, counterdrug activities, combatting terrorism, and law enforcement. The secretary of the Army is the DOD executive agent for MACA. In DSO, Army forces always support civil authorities—local, state, and federal (see JP 3-07.7; FM 3-07).
Refugee Processing—A Support Operation

The nature of support operations often requires Army force commanders to report directly to a lead federal agency. In May 1980, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) established a Cuban refugee processing center at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. An Army task force consisting of AC and RC forces supported the operation and reported to FEMA.

In 1994, Logistics Task Force 64 supported Department of State and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) representatives in establishing refugee camps in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Army engineers, military police, medical personnel, logisticians, and legal representatives provided a variety of services—including food, water, laundry, billeting, security, and maintenance—for 14,000 Haitian and 30,000 Cuban refugees.

In August 1999, over 550 Army AC and RC soldiers formed Task Force Provide Refuge, an administrative and logistic organization to care for Kosovo refugees at Fort Dix, New Jersey. The task force commander responded to the INS while receiving, screening, and processing the refugees until they returned home or relocated within the US.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

10-7. Army forces usually conduct FHA operations to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters (see DODD 5100.46). They also relieve conditions—such as pain, disease, hunger, or privation—that present a serious threat to life or loss of property. Army forces supplement or complement efforts of host nation civil authorities or agencies that provide assistance. FHA is limited in scope and duration. It focuses exclusively on prompt aid to resolve an immediate crisis. Longer-term activities designed to support full recovery and a return to predisaster conditions will normally become part of a combatant commander’s theater engagement plan. In such cases, an FHA operation transitions to a stability operation.

10-8. Many FHA and DSO activities, especially those involving relief operations, are similar. Specific legal restrictions apply to US forces operating within the US and its territories. In some cases, similar restrictions apply to US forces conducting FHA. For example, DOD has extended the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act to US forces overseas (see DODD 5525.5).

10-9. Army forces execute FHA operations, usually as part of a joint task force (JTF), with the US country team of the affected country. They provide support under appropriate treaties, memorandums of agreement, memorandums of understanding, and US fiscal authority and foreign policy. The US Agency for International Development is the lead US agency for coordinating FHA. Army forces usually conduct FHA operations to support host nation civil authorities and in concert with other civilian agencies—US, international, governmental and private.
JTF Support Hope—Foreign Humanitarian Assistance in Africa

On 6 April 1994, an aircraft carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi crashed while landing at Kigali, Rwanda. The Rwandan president’s death unleashed ethnic conflict that saw the deaths of between 500,000 and 1 million members of the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups. By August 1994, so many Rwandan refugees had fled to neighboring Zaire that they overwhelmed the humanitarian resources there. Thousands of refugees died of malnutrition and cholera, prompting a United Nations response to the crisis.

President Clinton ordered the US European Command (USEUCOM) to assist humanitarian agencies and third nation forces conducting relief operations. USEUCOM activated JTF Support Hope to support the multinational effort. The JTF consisted of 3,000 personnel, including soldiers from the 21st Theater Army Area Command in Germany. US forces provided water distribution and purification systems at Goma, Zaire, and operated an airhead and cargo distribution center at Entebbe, Uganda. They also provided airfield services and logistic support to UN forces. The JTF efforts helped humanitarian relief agencies in Goma to recover. By late August, refugee deaths dropped from 25,000 per day to fewer than 250. As the situation stabilized, civilian agencies assumed terminal operations responsibility. US forces returned to home station on 29 September 1994.

THE ARMY’S ROLE IN SUPPORT OPERATIONS

10-10. The Army is not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for support operations. Army forces are designed and organized for warfighting. However, their warfighting capabilities are particularly suited to DSO and FHA. The Army is a disciplined force with well-established, flexible, and adaptable procedures. Army units have a functional chain of command, reliable communications, and well-trained and well-equipped organizations. They can operate and sustain themselves in austere environments with organic assets. The Army can rapidly move large forces to the affected location using military transportation. Army engineer, military police, medical, transportation, aviation, and civil affairs assets are especially valuable for support operations.

10-11. The special qualities, capabilities, and geographic dispersion of RC units make them especially suitable for DSO. The long-term relationships with state and local officials and the locations of RC units facilitate rapid response. The US Army Reserve has more than 2,000 units in the US, Guam, North Mariana Islands, American Samoa, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and Germany. The Army National Guard (ARNG) has units in 2,700 communities in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. State control of ARNG units allows them to respond quickly in emergencies. Nonfederalized ARNG units act on orders of their state governor. When in a state supporting or nonfederalized role, the ARNG is not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act.
FORMS OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

10-12. During DSO Army forces perform relief operations, support to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive consequence management (CBRNE-CM), support to civil law enforcement, and community assistance. In FHA Army forces most often conduct relief operations; however, FHA may also involve support to incidents involving CBRNE and community assistance. Army forces involved in support operations execute overlapping activities (see Figure 10-1).

RELIEF OPERATIONS

10-13. In case of a disaster, state, local, and host nation authorities are responsible for restoring essential services. To support their efforts or those of the lead agency, the National Command Authorities (NCA) can deploy Army forces (see Figure 10-2). Army forces execute similar actions during relief operations under DSO and FHA. Disaster relief focuses on recovery of critical infrastructure after a natural or manmade disaster. Humanitarian relief focuses on the well-being of supported populations. Both normally occur simultaneously.

Critical Relief Functions
- Search and rescue
- Emergency flood control
- Hazard identification
- Food distribution
- Water production, purification, and distribution
- Temporary shelter
- Transportation support
- Fire fighting
- Medical support
- Power generation
- Communications support
- Sanitation
Disaster Relief

10-14. Disaster relief restores or recreates essential infrastructure. It includes establishing and maintaining the minimum safe working conditions, less security measures, necessary to protect relief workers and the affected population. (Overseas, Army forces may provide security as part of a stability operation, such as Haiti in 1994. Domestically, Army forces may provide
security as support to civil law enforcement, as was done during the 1996 Atlanta Olympics.) Disaster relief allows effective humanitarian relief and creates the conditions for long-term recovery. It may involve consultation on and provision of emergency medical treatment and evacuation; repairing or demolishing damaged structures; restoring or building bridges, roads, and airfields; and removing debris from supply routes and relief sites. Army engineers are well suited and often critical for disaster relief.

### JTF Andrew—Disaster Relief in the Continental United States

On 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew blasted the southern Florida coast with winds exceeding 160 miles per hour, cutting a 35-mile path of destruction just south of Miami. The hurricane destroyed 65,000 homes, leaving survivors without water, electricity, or telephone service. Heavy debris blocked most roads, making ambulance and fire services difficult and slowing food delivery.

As DOD executive agent for disaster relief, the Department of the Army directed Forces Command and the Second Continental US Army to form JTF Andrew. The 82d Airborne Division alerted, and its lead battalion departed for Florida nine hours later. Forty-eight hours after that, additional soldiers from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, New York, joined Army advance elements. Within five days, JTF Andrew grew to 9,500 soldiers, 3,400 sailors, 800 Marines, and 1,000 airmen from the active and reserve components.

JTF Andrew worked closely with federal, state, and local agencies to provide housing and meals for disaster victims. It operated 24 support sites that produced 35,000 meals per day. The JTF also established four life support centers that provided tents, medical care, potable drinking water, showers, housing repair materials, and donated items. Army Medical Command distributed clothes, diapers, bottled water, and food. Army Medical Command provided combat stress, preventive medicine, veterinary, and health facilities planning augmentation to the 44th Medical Brigade and divisional medical elements. Army forces significantly contributed to the unified action that relieved human suffering and aided victims in rebuilding their communities.

### Humanitarian Relief

10-15. Humanitarian relief focuses on lifesaving measures that alleviate the immediate needs of a population in crisis. It often includes providing medical support, food, water, medicine, clothing, blankets, shelter, and heating or cooking fuels. In some cases, it involves transporting affected people from a disaster area. Civilian relief agencies, governmental and nongovernmental, are best suited to provide this type of relief. Army forces conducting humanitarian relief usually facilitate civil relief efforts.

### SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVE CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

10-16. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incidents are deliberate or unintentional events involving a
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive, that produce catastrophic loss of life or property. Army forces assist civil authorities in protecting US territory, population, and infrastructure before an attack by supporting domestic preparedness and protecting critical assets. When directed by DOD, Army forces can respond to a CBRNE incident and deal with the consequences.

Domestic Preparedness

10-17. The National Domestic Preparedness Office, under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), orchestrates the national domestic preparedness effort. Army forces have an important role in aiding domestic preparedness efforts at the local, state, and federal level. These efforts strengthen the existing expertise of civil authorities through training. They also provide the expert assistance necessary to respond to nuclear, biological, or chemical incidents. Army forces provide training to enhance state and local emergency response capabilities so they can respond to incidents. An interagency agreement establishes the Department of Justice as domestic preparedness coordinator.

10-18. Under the Department of Justice, the Center for Domestic Preparedness at McClellan, Alabama, trains emergency first responders, emergency management officials, and state and local officials to respond to terrorist acts involving CBRNE. The US Army’s Soldier and Biological Chemical Command is engaged in implementing the city training program mandated by The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996. Also, the Army Medical Department (AMEDD), in close cooperation with federal, state, and local health organizations, presents courses in the medical management of nuclear, chemical, and biological casualties.

Protection of Critical Assets

10-19. Hostile forces may attack facilities essential to society, the government, and the military. These assaults can disrupt civilian commerce, government operations, and military capabilities. Critical assets include telecommunications, electric power, public health services and facilities, gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, water, emergency services, and government continuity. DODD 5160.54 identifies specific civil infrastructure assets necessary to conduct military operations. The integrity, availability, survivability, and capability of these assets are vital for conducting full spectrum operations. In conjunction with civil law enforcement, Army forces may protect these assets or temporarily restore lost capability. Army involvement in protecting critical assets complements and leverages related inter-agency programs and activities.

Response to CBRNE Incidents

10-20. Other government agencies have primary responsibility for responding to domestic CBRNE incidents. Local authorities will be the first to respond to a CBRNE incident. However, Army forces have a key supporting role and can quickly respond when authorized. For example, the ARNG has specialized CBRNE response teams that act as advance parties to facilitate follow-on deployment of other DOD assets. In a permissive overseas...
environment, the NCA may make Army assets available to assist a foreign government after a CBRNE incident. Such assistance may be linked to concurrent relief operations. Figure 10-3 illustrates joint and Army command and support relationships in domestic incidents involving CBRNE consequence management.

10-21. The Federal Response Plan is the key plan that affects the use of Army forces in CBRNE incidents. The distinctions between the responsibilities of DOD and other agencies are embedded in federal law, the Federal Response Plan and other federal plans, the Federal Response Plan terrorist incident annex, joint doctrine, and directives.

Figure 10-3. Domestic Support Relationships for CBRNE Consequence Management Support
10-22. The resources required to deal with CBRNE incidents differ from those needed during conventional disasters. Mass casualties may require decontamination and a surge of medical resources, to include antidotes, vaccines, and antibiotics. The sudden onset of a large number of casualties may pose public health threats related to food, vectors, water, waste, and mental health. Damage to chemical and industrial plants and secondary hazards such as fires may cause toxic environmental hazards. Mass evacuation may be necessary.

10-23. The Army possesses capabilities suited to respond to CBRNE incidents. Chemical units can detect chemical and biological agents and decontaminate equipment and property. The US Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM) can provide large-scale medical care. Its experienced, clinicians, planners, and support staffs can furnish assessment, triage, treatment, trauma care, hospitalization, and follow-up care for chemical and biological casualties. It can deploy a field hospital or evacuate victims to fixed facilities. USAMEDCOM maintains special medical augmentation response teams (SMARTs) that rapidly deploy to assist in medical treatment and response. SMARTs focus on chemical and biological casualties, trauma and critical care, stress management, burns, and preventive medical threat assessment.

**SUPPORT TO CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT**

10-24. Support to domestic civil law enforcement involves activities related to counterterrorism, counterdrug operations, military assistance during civil disturbances, and general support. Army support involves providing resources, training, or augmentation. Federal military forces remain under the military chain of command while supporting civil law enforcement. The supported law enforcement agency coordinates Army force activities under appropriate civil laws and interagency agreements. ARNG units in state status can be a particularly useful military resource. They may be able to provide assistance to civil authorities when federal units cannot due to the Posse Comitatus Act.

**Support to Counterterrorism**

10-25. When the NCA directs, military assets supporting a lead agency may operate with the Department of Justice to provide support to counterterrorism. Army forces may provide transportation, equipment, training, and personnel. When terrorists pose an imminent threat, Army forces may be used to counter it. The demonstrated capability to conduct these operations helps keep US territory from becoming a target.
10-26. Crisis management of a terrorist incident includes measures to resolve a situation and investigate a criminal case for prosecution under federal law. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency, with responsibility for crisis management in the US. Army forces may provide specialized or technical capabilities to help defuse or resolve a crisis. Support of crisis management includes opening lines of communication for military assistance, evacuating casualties, reconnaissance, and decontaminating or assessing CBRNE. After a terrorist incident, the military may support consequence management activities.

Support to Counterdrug Operations

10-27. The Department of Justice, primarily through the Drug Enforcement Administration, is responsible for enforcing US drug laws. Drug-related crime often affects multiple local, state, and federal jurisdictions. Law enforcement agencies at all levels deal with counterdrug activities. Title 10 US Code (USC) strictly limits Army and federaled ARNG support to counterdrug operations. Title 32 USC, section 112, governs the use of the state-controlled ARNG forces in counterdrug operations.

10-28. Four combatant commands have counterdrug responsibilities: US Southern Command (USOUTHCOM), US Pacific Command (USPACOM), North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and USJFCOM. Each commander has dedicated a subordinate organization, in whole or in part, to the counterdrug mission. For example, USJFCOM maintains JTF 6 as a coordinating headquarters for military support to multiagency counterdrug operations in the continental US (see JP 3-07.4).

Civil Disturbance Operations

10-29. The Army assists civil authorities in restoring law and order when state and local law enforcement agencies cannot control civil disturbances. The ARNG is the first military responder during most civil disturbance situations. It usually remains on state active duty status throughout the operation. When the conditions of domestic violence and disorder endanger life and property to the extent that state law enforcement agencies, to include the ARNG, cannot suppress violence and restore law and order, the president may federalize ARNG units under Title 10 USC, Chapter 15. The president may use federalized ARNG and federal forces to restore law and order. Restrictions may be placed on federal military forces, either in the presidential executive order directing their use or through the rules for the use of force outlined in the DOD Civil Disturbance Plan (Garden Plot).

General Support

10-30. Title 10 USC, sections 371–382, and other federal laws allow for additional limited military support to law enforcement agencies. The military may share information and provide equipment, facilities, and other services (see DODD 5525.5). Other exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act are contained in
the annual DOD Authorization Act, which allows specific types of military support, usually related to the national counterdrug effort.

10-31. DOD may direct Army forces to provide training to federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement agencies. This training may include operation and maintenance of military equipment. Training of federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement officials is provided as follows:

- Military departments and defense agencies may provide expert advice to federal, state, or local law enforcement officials in accordance with Title 10 USC, section 373.
- Assistance is normally limited to situations when using non-DOD personnel is infeasible or impractical from a cost or time perspective and when the assistance will not compromise national security or military preparedness.
- Assistance may not involve DOD personnel in a direct role in a law enforcement operation, except as otherwise authorized by law.
- Assistance must be where there is not a reasonable likelihood of armed confrontation with civilians, except as otherwise authorized by law.

COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE

10-32. Community assistance is a broad range of activities that provide support and maintain a strong connection between the military and civilian communities. Community assistance activities provide effective means of projecting a positive military image, providing training opportunities, and enhancing the relationship between the Army and the American public. They should fulfill community needs that would not otherwise be met.

10-33. Community assistance activities can enhance individual and unit combat readiness. Projects should exercise individual soldier skills, encourage teamwork, and challenge leader planning and coordination skills. They should result in measurable accomplishments and increase soldier proficiency. Commanders of forward-deployed Army units may apply these concepts to foster or establish relationships with host nation communities.

10-34. Community assistance at the national level enhances cooperation between the Army and the American people. National efforts take advantage of the technical, vocational, and group skills of military professionals. They supplement programs available from the civil sector and other government agencies. The Army’s involvement focuses on economic and social issues with
long-term national security implications. They provide opportunities for the Army to contribute to the growth and welfare of the nation, improving its perception of the military. Army and DOD regulations provide guidance on national-level programs.

10-35. The Army has extensive national-level responsibilities related to public works maintenance and management. The Department of the Army exercises its federal engineering executive oversight responsibilities through the US Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps of Engineers manages much of the nation’s public works infrastructure. Executed principally, but not solely, through the Civil Works Directorate, this military organization integrates complex federal, state, and local regulations and policies governing the national infrastructure. These include the national waterways, environmental remediation and recovery operations, real estate, disaster recovery operations, and general project management functions.

10-36. Efforts at the state and local levels also improve community perception of the Army. Community assistance varies widely, ranging from individual soldier involvement to full installation participation. An installation or organization can enter agreements with the local community to provide critical services not otherwise available, augment community services unable to meet demand, or ensure that emergency services are available in the shortest possible time.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Critical Services</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Air ambulance support</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Search and rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Firefighting capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Emergency or broad-based medical care</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Wildlife and domestic animal management</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Assistance in safety and traffic control</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Emergency snow removal</td>
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<td>• Temporary supplemental housing for the displaced or disadvantaged</td>
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10-37. Army participation in public events, memorials, and exhibits allows interaction between soldiers and the local community. This contact communicates Army professionalism, readiness, and standards. Individual soldiers serve as representatives and role models, promote and inspire patriotism, and generate interest in the Army. Increased public awareness enhances the Army’s reputation and secures the American people’s confidence.

10-38. Laws, regulations, and policies limit Army participation in community assistance activities. Commanders consider the objective and purpose of an activity when deciding whether to approve it. They also consider authorized limits of Army participation. Commanders ensure that their initiatives do not compete with local resources or services and will not result in reimbursement in any form. Commanders also avoid providing assistance and support to one segment of a community that cannot also be provided to others. Actions that appear to benefit a particular group can foster perceptions of bias or partisanship. Ideally, support should be provided only to events and activities of common interest and benefit across the community.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUPPORT OPERATIONS

10-39. Although each support operation is different, the visualization process, military decision making process, and troop leading procedures apply. The following considerations supplement those processes and can help commanders develop tailored concepts for support operations.

PROVIDE ESSENTIAL SUPPORT TO THE LARGEST NUMBER OF PEOPLE

10-40. The principle commanders use to prioritize missions and allocate support is, essential support to the largest number. Commanders allocate finite resources to achieve the greatest possible good. Initial efforts usually focus on restoring vital services: food and water distribution, medical aid, power generation, search and rescue, firefighting, and community relations. It may be necessary to complete a lower priority task before accomplishing a higher priority one. For example, Army forces may have to restore limited electrical services before restoring hospital emergency rooms and shelter operations.

10-41. Commanders assess requirements to determine how and where to apply limited assets to benefit the most people. In some cases, warfighting reconnaissance capabilities and techniques can be used. For example, unmanned aerial vehicles can survey relief routes and locate civilian refugee groups. Civil affairs or dedicated disaster assessment teams, as well as interagency, host nation, and nongovernmental organization sources, can reinforce and supplement standard information collection methods. Combining traditional and nontraditional means of collecting information allows commanders to obtain a clear understanding of the situation and adjust plans accordingly.

COORDINATE ACTIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES

10-42. DSO and FHA operations are typically joint and interagency; FHA operations are also multinational. The potential for duplicating effort and working at cross-purposes is high. Unity of effort requires, at least, a common understanding of purposes and direction among all agencies. Ensuring unity of effort and efficient resource use requires constant coordination. In FHA operations, Army forces enhance unity of effort by establishing a civil-military operations center. In DSO, they provide liaison elements, planning support, advisors, and technical experts to the lead agency. Through these contacts, commanders determine where their objectives and plans complement or conflict with those of other agencies. Each participant’s capabilities will be in constant demand.

ESTABLISH MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

10-43. With supported agencies and governments, commanders establish measures of effectiveness to gauge mission accomplishment. Measures of effectiveness focus on the condition and activity of those being supported. Those that are discrete, measurable, and link cause and effect help commanders understand and measure progress and success. In famine relief, for example, it may be tempting to measure effectiveness by the gross amount of food delivered. In some cases, this may be an acceptable gauge. However, a better one may be the total nourishment delivered, as measured by the total number of calories delivered per person per day, or the rate of decline of deaths.
directly attributable to starvation. Measures of effectiveness depend on the situation and require readjustment as the situation and guidance change.

**Measures of Effectiveness—Operation Support Hope**

Mission statements generally provide goals from which to develop measures of effectiveness. The first and most urgent task facing planners for Operation Support Hope in Rwanda, July 1994, was the US Commander in Chief, Europe, directive to "stop the dying." Initial action focused on the massive refugee deaths from cholera around Goma, Zaire. The JTF commander decided to measure US effectiveness by whether refugee camp death rates dropped to the level the UN determined was consistent with "normal" camp operations. A related mission requirement was to open Kigali airfield for 24-hour operations; success was measured by statistical data that showed the surge in airfield use and cargo throughput after US forces arrived. Both measures of effectiveness derived from the mission statement were used throughout the operation to communicate progress to all participants.

**HAND OVER TO CIVILIAN AGENCIES AS SOON AS FEASIBLE**

10-44. The timing and feasibility of transferring control from military to civil authorities depends on mission-specific considerations. The two most important are the ability of civil authorities to resume operations without Army assistance and the need to commit Army forces to other operations. Commanders identify and include other civil considerations as early in the planning process as possible. They continually consider the long-term goals of the civil leadership and communities they assist. While the immediate goal of support operations is relieving hardship and suffering, the ultimate goal is creating conditions necessary for civil follow-on operations. Transferring activities to civil authorities and withdrawing Army forces are positive signals to the supported population and the Army. It indicates that the community has recovered enough for civil agencies to resume control, that life is returning to normal, and that the Army has successfully completed its support mission.