Chapter 2

Unified Action

Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower
Special Message to the Congress on Reorganization of the Defense Establishment, 3 April 1958

2-1. In full spectrum operations, Army forces operate as part of a joint force, often within a multinational and interagency environment. Unified action describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified (subunified) commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. Public law charges combatant commanders with employing military forces through unified action. Under unified action, commanders integrate joint, single-service, special, and supporting operations with interagency, nongovernmental, and multinational—to include United Nations (UN)—operations (see JP 0-2).

2-2. Unified action links subordinates to the combatant commander under combatant command (command authority) (COCOM). Multinational, interagency, and nonmilitary forces work with the combatant commander through cooperation and coordination. Regardless of the task or the nature of the threat, combatant commanders employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces, and coordinate with multinational and interagency partners, to achieve strategic and operational objectives. They formulate theater strategies and campaigns, organize joint forces, designate operational areas, and provide strategic guidance and operational focus to subordinates. The aim is to achieve unity of effort among many diverse agencies in a complex environment. Subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) synchronize joint operations in time and space, direct the action of foreign military forces
(multinational operations), and coordinate with governmental and nongovernmental organizations (interagency coordination) to achieve the same goal.

### Unified Action in Haiti

In September 1994, the US Army's XVIII Airborne Corps participated in Operation Uphold Democracy, a UN-sanctioned operation to return Haiti's deposed president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to office. The National Security Council’s Haiti Interagency Working Group planned the operation with the UN, Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Atlantic Command, and XVIII Airborne Corps. Together, the agencies and headquarters developed flexible force deployment options that reflected changing political conditions. Army forces with staff augmentation served as Joint Task Forces (JTFs) 180 and 190. On arrival, they stabilized the country until President Aristide’s return. JTF 190 worked with the combatant commander, supporting governmental and nongovernmental agencies, joint and multinational forces, and nongovernmental organizations to secure the cities and countryside, disarm the Haitian military, replace the local police, and assist the Haitian people. Army forces then supported the UN by stabilizing the country until elections were held in March 1995.

### THE LEVELS OF WAR

2-3. The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. Understanding the interdependent relationship of all three helps commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. Actions within the three levels are not associated with a particular command level, unit size, equipment type, or force or component type. Instead, actions are defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives (see Figure 2-1).

### THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

2-4. The strategic level is that level at which a nation, often as one of a group of nations, determines national and multinational security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish them. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives. The National Command Authorities (NCA) translate policy into national strategic military objectives. These national strategic objectives facilitate theater strategic planning. Military strategy, derived from policy, is the basis for all operations (see JP 3-0).

### THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

2-5. The operational level of war is the level at which campaigns and major operations are conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives
within theaters or areas of operations (AOs). It links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art—the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. A campaign is a related series of military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. A major operation is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by various combat forces of a single or several services, coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational, and sometimes strategic objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially under a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces are employed to influence the enemy disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the
arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Figure 2-1 (page 2-3) illustrates the link between the levels of war and the plans and actions of military forces.

2-6. Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It includes employing military forces and arranging their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle. It provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements with relative attrition the only measure of success. Operational art requires commanders who can visualize, anticipate, create, and seize opportunities. It is practiced not only by JFCs, but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders.

2-7. Operations usually imply broader dimensions of time and space than tactics; the strategic orientation at the operational level requires commanders to look beyond the immediate situation. While tactical commanders fight the current battle, operational commanders look deeper in time, space, and events. They seek to shape the possibilities of upcoming events in advance to create the most favorable conditions possible for subordinate commanders, whose tactical activities execute the campaign. Likewise, operational commanders anticipate the results of battles and engagements, and prepare to exploit them to obtain the greatest strategic advantage.

2-8. Operational commanders continually communicate with their strategic superiors to obtain direction and ensure common understanding of events. Mutual confidence and communications among commanders and staffs allow the flexibility to adapt to tactical circumstances as they develop. Tactical results influence the conduct of campaigns through a complex interaction of operational and tactical dynamics. Operational commanders create the conditions for the conduct of battles and engagements, while the results of battles and engagements shape the conduct of the campaign. In this regard, commanders exploit tactical victories to gain strategic advantage, or even to reverse the strategic effect of tactical losses.

2-9. Operational art is translated into operation plans through operational design. A well-designed plan and successfully executed operation shape the situation for tactical actions. Executed skillfully, a good plan increases the chances of tactical success. It does this by creating advantages for friendly forces and disadvantages for the enemy. A flexible plan gives tactical commanders freedom to seize opportunities or react effectively to unforeseen enemy actions and capabilities. Flexible execution maintains the operational initiative and maximizes tactical opportunities.

2-10. Without tactical success, a campaign cannot achieve its operational goals. An essential element of operational art, therefore, is the ability to recognize what is possible at the tactical level and design a plan that maximizes chances for the success in battles and engagements that ultimately produces the desired operational end state. Without a coherent operational design to link tactical successes, battles and engagements waste precious resources on fights that do not lead to operational goals. A thorough understanding of what is possible tactically, and the ability to create conditions that increase
the chances of tactical success, are important attributes of an operational commander. Tactical commanders must understand the operational context within which battles and engagements are fought as well. This understanding allows them to seize opportunities (both foreseen and unforeseen) that contribute to achieving operational goals or defeating enemy initiatives that threaten those goals. Operational commanders require experience at both the operational and tactical levels. From this experience, they gain the instincts and intuition, as well as the knowledge, that underlie an understanding of the interrelation of tactical and operational possibilities and needs.

2-11. Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions:

- What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal (ends)?
- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition (ways)?
- How should resources be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)?
- What are the likely costs or risks in performing that sequence of actions (risk management)?

THE TACTICAL LEVEL

2-12. Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. A battle consists of a set of related engagements that last longer and involve larger forces than an engagement. Battles can affect the course of a campaign or major operation. An engagement is a small tactical conflict between opposing maneuver forces, usually conducted at brigade level and below. Engagements are usually short—minutes, hours, or a day (see FM 3-90).

2-13. Tactics is also the realm of close combat, where friendly forces are in immediate contact and use direct and indirect fires to defeat or destroy enemy forces and to seize or retain ground. Exposure to close combat separates Army forces from most of their counterparts. Army forces fight until the purpose of the operation is accomplished. Because of this, they are organized to endure losses, provided with combat service support (CSS) to generate and sustain combat power, and trained to deal with uncertainty.

2-14. The operational-level headquarters sets the terms of battle and provides resources for tactical operations. Tactical success is measured by the contribution of an action to the achievement of operationally significant results. Battles and engagements that do not contribute to the campaign objectives, directly or indirectly, are avoided. Figure 2-1 (page 2-3) illustrates the linkages among the levels of war using military actions in the Gulf War of 1991. The strategic guidance issued by the president translated into orders and actions that led to the staff sergeant tank commander engaging Iraqi tanks in the middle of the night. The destruction of the Iraqi tanks in turn enabled the coalition to restore the Kuwaiti government.
Operation Assured Response—An Example of Joint Synergy

During the 1996 Operation Assured Response in Liberia, forces from the Republic of Georgia, Italy, and Germany joined with US special operations, Air Force, Navy, and Marine forces to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation. In early April 1996, gunmen had filled the streets of Monrovia, Liberia, as the country split into armed factions intent on seizing power. The situation worsened as faction members took hostages. On 9 April, President Clinton ordered the US military to evacuate American personnel and designated third-party foreign nationals. The Army deployed Special Forces, an airborne company, signal augmentation and a medical section as part of a special operations task force from Special Operations Command–Europe. Army forces entered Monrovia’s Mamba Point embassy district, where they established security for international relief agencies headquartered there. Additional Army forces reinforced the Marine guards at the American embassy and secured the central evacuee assembly collection point. Upon securing the evacuees, Navy helicopters took them to Sierra Leone. The combined capabilities of Army forces, other services, and multinational troops demonstrated joint synergy and resulted in the successful evacuation of individuals from 73 countries.

CONDUCT OF UNIFIED ACTION

2-15. In unified action, Army forces synchronize their actions with those of other participants to achieve unity of effort and accomplish the combatant commander’s objectives. The capabilities of joint, multinational, and inter-agency partners can expand strengths, compensate for limitations, and provide operational and tactical depth to Army forces.

JOINT OPERATIONS

2-16. Joint operations involve forces of two or more services under a single commander. Land operations and joint operations are mutually enabling—land operations are inherently joint operations. Joint integration allows JFCs to attack an opponent throughout the depth of their AO, seize the initiative, maintain momentum, and exploit success. Effective joint integration does not require joint commands at all echelons, but does require understanding joint synergy at all levels of command. Joint synergy extends the concept of combined arms synergy familiar to soldiers. The strengths of each service component combine to overcome the limitations or reinforce the effects of the other components. The combination of multiple and diverse joint force capabilities creates military power more potent than the sum of its parts.

Unless limited by the establishing directive, the commander of the supported force will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

JP 0-2
2-17. JFCs often establish supported and supporting relationships among components. They may change these relationships between phases of the campaign or major operation or between tasks within phases. Each subordinate element of the joint force can support or be supported by other elements. For example, the Navy component commander or joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) is normally the supported commander for sea control operations; the joint force air component commander (JFACC) is normally the supported commander for counterair operations. Army forces may be the supporting force during certain phases of the campaign and become the supported force in other phases. Inside JFC-assigned AOs, the land and naval force commanders are the supported commanders and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction.

THE OTHER ARMED FORCES

2-18. Through Title 10, US Code (USC), and DODD 5100.1, Congress has organized the national defense and defined the function of each armed service. All US armed forces—Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard—and special operations forces (SOF) are required to provide globally responsive assets to support combatant commanders' theater strategies and the national security strategy. The capabilities of the other armed forces complement those of Army forces. During joint operations, they provide support consistent with JFC-directed missions.

Air Force

2-19. Air Force air platform support is invaluable in creating the conditions for success before and during land operations. Support of the land force commander's concept for ground operations is an essential and integral part of each phase of the operation. Air Force strategic and intratheater airlift, directed by US Transportation Command, supports the movement of Army forces, especially initial-entry forces, into an AO. Air assets move Army forces between and within theaters to support JFC objectives. Fires from Air Force systems create the conditions for decisive land operations. In addition, the Air Force provides a variety of information-related functions—to include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—that support land operations.

2-20. Support from Army forces made available to the JFACC for tasking—including Army aviation, air defense, military intelligence, and field artillery—is invaluable in accomplishing portions of the counterair, interdiction, theater reconnaissance, and surveillance missions. Such missions may support operations directed by the land component commander or JFC. The effectiveness of air interdiction and close air support depends, to a large degree, on integrating land maneuver with the joint force concept of operations. Land force commanders understand that defeating enemy air and space capabilities is necessary to ensure freedom of action on the ground.

Navy and Marine Corps

2-21. The Navy and Marine Corps conduct operations in oceans and littoral (coastal) regions. The Navy's two basic functions are sea control operations and maritime power projection. Sea control connotes uninhibited use of
designated sea areas and the associated airspace and underwater volume. It affords Army forces uninhibited transit to any trouble spot in the world.

2-22. Maritime power projection covers a broad spectrum of offensive naval operations. Those most important to Army force operations include employment of carrier-based aircraft, lodgment by amphibious assault or maritime pre-positioned deployment, and naval bombardment with guns and missiles. Naval forces establish and protect the sea routes that form strategic lines of communications for land forces. The Navy provides strategic sealift vital for deploying Army forces. Army forces cannot conduct sustained land operations unless the Navy controls the sea. Additionally, naval forces augment theater aerospace assets and provide complementary amphibious entry capabilities.

2-23. The Marine Corps, with its expeditionary character and potent forcible entry capabilities, complements the other services with its ability to react rapidly and seize bases suitable for force projection. The Marine Corps often provides powerful air and ground capabilities that complement or reinforce those of Army forces. When coordinated under a joint force land component commander (JFLCC), Army and Marine forces provide a highly flexible force capable of decisive land operations in any environment.

Coast Guard

2-24. The Coast Guard is an armed force under the Department of Transportation. It has a statutory civil law enforcement mission and authority. Army forces support Coast Guard forces, especially during counterdrug interdiction and seizure operations. When directed by the president or upon a formal declaration of war, the Coast Guard becomes a specialized service under the Navy. The Coast Guard and Navy cooperate in naval coastal warfare missions during peace, conflict, and war. During deployment and redeployment operations, the Coast Guard supports force projection. It protects military shipping at seaports of embarkation and debarkation in the US and overseas. The Coast Guard supports JFCs with port security units and patrol craft.

Special Operations Forces

2-25. SOF provide flexible, rapidly deployable capabilities that are useful across the range of military operations. SOF can reinforce, augment, and complement conventional forces. They can also conduct independent operations in situations that demand a small, discrete, highly trained force. SOF provide the NCA and combatant commanders with options that limit the risk of escalation that might otherwise accompany the commitment of larger conventional forces. In war, SOF normally support the theater campaign or major operations of the JFC. In military operations other than war (MOOTW), SOF support combatant commander theater engagement plans, often directly supporting a US ambassador. Combatant commanders establish or designate operational command and support relationships for SOF based on mission requirements.
2-26. Land force commanders frequently require Army special operations forces (ARSOF) assets. ARSOF can conduct diverse missions and are a valuable combat multiplier for land operations (see FM 3-05). For example, psychological operations units can fuse the capabilities of US government departments and agencies to counter adversary propaganda, misinformation and disinformation. SOF language capabilities and regional and cultural skills are also useful in stability operations and support operations.

EMPELOYING ARMY FORCES IN JOINT OPERATIONS

2-27. Joint doctrine describes the employment of US forces in joint operations. Army force commanders are always either subordinate to or designated as a JFC. Understanding the command and control (C2) relationships among the components of a joint force is the key to effective joint operations.

Army Forces in Unified Commands

2-28. Except for forces exempted by the secretary of defense, military departments assign all forces, to include nonfederalized Army National Guard and unmobilized US Army Reserve forces, under COCOM of combatant commanders (see JP 0-2). The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) apportions major Army forces by type to combatant commanders for deliberate planning. In addition to forces assigned in peacetime, Army forces are allocated to combatant commanders in response to crises. The secretary of defense, through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directs other combatant commanders to reinforce the supported combatant commander with augmentation forces.

Assigned forces are those forces that have been placed under the combatant command (command authority) of a unified commander by the secretary of defense. Forces and resources so assigned are available for normal peacetime operations of that command. Apportioned forces and resources are those made available for deliberate planning as of a certain date. They may include assigned, those expected through mobilization, and those programmed. Allocated forces and resources are those provided by the NCA for execution planning or actual implementation. Augmentation forces are forces to be transferred from a supporting commander to the combatant command (command authority) or operational control of a supported commander during the execution of an operation order approved by the NCA.

Chain of Command

2-29. The NCA exercise authority and control of the armed forces through a single chain of command with two branches (see Figure 2-2, page 2-10). One branch goes from the NCA to combatant commanders to the service component commands and subordinate joint commands. It is for the conduct of operations and support. The other branch goes from the NCA to the military
departments to their respective major service commands. An administrative control relationship exists between the secretary of the military department and the respective service component commands. It is for carrying out the military departments' Title 10 responsibilities of recruiting, manning, equipping, training, and providing service forces to the combatant commanders. Although the service branch of the chain of command is distinct from the operating branch, both the Army service component command (ASCC) and the ARFOR operate within the combatant commander’s chain of command.

Note: This diagram is only an example. It does not prescribe joint force organization. Service components at lower echelons may only contain service forces.

LEGEND
- - Chain of Command
- - - Administrative Control
- - - - Channel of Communication

Figure 2-2. The Chain of Command and Control
Command Relationships

2-30. At theater level, when Army forces operate outside the US, they are assigned under a JFC (see JP 0-2; JP 3-0; FM 3-100.7). A JFC is a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force (JTF) commander authorized to exercise COCOM or operational control (OPCON) over a joint force. Combatant commanders provide strategic direction and operational focus to forces by developing strategy, planning theater campaigns, organizing the theater, and establishing command relationships. JFCs plan, conduct, and support campaigns in the theater of war, subordinate theater campaigns, major operations, and battles. The four joint command relationships are COCOM, OPCON, tactical control (TACON), and support (see Figure 2-3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inherent responsibilities are:</th>
<th>COCOM</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>TACON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has command relationship with:</td>
<td>Gaining combatant commander; gaining service component commander</td>
<td>Gaining command</td>
<td>Gaining command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May be task organized by:</td>
<td>Gaining combatant commander; gaining service component commander</td>
<td>Gaining command</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives logistic support from:</td>
<td>Gaining service component commander</td>
<td>Service component commander; parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned position or AO by:</td>
<td>Gaining component commander</td>
<td>Gaining command</td>
<td>Gaining command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides liaison to:</td>
<td>As required by gaining component commander</td>
<td>As required by gaining command</td>
<td>As required by gaining command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishes and maintains communications with:</td>
<td>As required by gaining component commander</td>
<td>As required by gaining command</td>
<td>As required by gaining command &amp; parent units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has priorities established by:</td>
<td>Gaining component commander</td>
<td>Gaining command</td>
<td>Gaining command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaining unit can impose further command relationship/authority of:</td>
<td>OPCON; TACON; direct support; mutual support; general support; close support</td>
<td>OPCON; TACON; direct support; mutual support; general support; close support</td>
<td>Direct support; mutual support; general support; close support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2-3. Joint Command Relationships and Inherent Responsibilities

2-31. Combatant Command (Command Authority). COCOM is a non-transferable command authority exercised only by combatant commanders unless the NCA direct otherwise. Combatant commanders exercise it over assigned forces. COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces to accomplish missions. Combatant commanders exercise COCOM through subordinate commands, to include subunified
2-32. Operational Control. OPCON is inherent in COCOM. It is the authority to perform those functions of command that involve organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON may be exercised at any echelon at or below the level of the combatant command. It can be delegated or transferred. Army commanders use it routinely to task organize forces. The secretary of defense must approve transferring OPCON of units between combatant commanders.

2-33. Tactical Control. TACON is authority normally limited to the detailed and specified local direction of movement and maneuver of forces to accomplish a task. It allows commanders below combatant command level to apply force and direct the tactical use of CSS assets but does not provide authority to change organizational structure or direct administrative or logistic support. The commander of the parent unit continues to exercise those responsibilities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive. Combatant commanders use TACON to delegate limited authority to direct the tactical use of combat forces. TACON is often the command relationship established between forces of different nations in a multinational force. It may be appropriate when tactical-level Army units are placed under another service headquarters. Army commanders make one Army force TACON to another when they want to withhold authority to change the subordinate force organizational structure and leave responsibility for administrative support or CSS with the parent unit of the subordinate force.

2-34. Administrative Control. Unless the secretary of defense specifies otherwise, administrative control (ADCON) of Army forces remains within the Army chain of command, from lowest levels to the ASCC to the secretary of the Army. Administrative control is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support. It includes organization of service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ADCON is synonymous with Title 10 USC administration and support responsibilities. It is always subject to the command authority of the combatant commander.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Army ADCON Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Personnel (including postal and personnel accounting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Finance (including commercial or vendor services)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Medical and dental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provost marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Logistics: Classes I, II, III, IV, and IX, maintenance, distribution, contracting, and mortuary affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• General engineering (including public works)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chaplain and religious activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2-35. **Support.** Joint doctrine establishes support as a command *authority*. Commanders establish it between subordinate commanders when one organization must aid, protect, or sustain another (see JP 0-2; JP 3-0). Under joint doctrine, there are four categories of support (see Figure 2-4). General and direct support describe the supporting command’s focus. Mutual and close support are forms of activity based on proximity and combat actions. Army doctrine establishes four support *relationships*: direct, reinforcing, general, and general support reinforcing (see Chapter 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General support</td>
<td>The action given to the supported force as a whole rather than to a particular subdivision thereof.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual support</td>
<td>The action that units render each other against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct support</td>
<td>A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force’s request for assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close support</td>
<td>The action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2-4. Joint Support Categories**

The Army Service Component Command

2-36. The ASCC commander is the senior Army commander in a combatant commander’s area of responsibility. The ASCC commander, using ADCON authority, is responsible for the Army Title 10 functions of preparing, maintaining, training, equipping, administering, and supporting Army forces attached to joint forces subordinate to the combatant command. Peacetime training of assigned Army forces is also under the ASCC. Combatant commanders may assign ASCCs responsibility for significant lead-service combat support (such as chemical decontamination) or common user logistic (CUL) functions. The ASCC also provides theater-strategic and operational-level support to combatant command campaign and major operation planning.

2-37. The ASCC commander normally designates an Army unit within each joint force subordinate to the combatant command as the ARFOR for that joint force. These ARFORs are responsible for accomplishing operational-level Army tasks within the joint force to which they are assigned. ASCC commanders establish C2 relationships for ARFORs and tailor the forces assigned to them to best meet combatant commander guidance. The ASCC commander may delegate authority to coordinate and execute Army operational-level Title 10 and lead-service CUL support responsibilities to a subordinate Army support unit, normally a theater support command (TSC). Other ASCC tasks described in JP 0-2 include—
• Recommending to the JFC or subunified commander the proper employment of Army component forces.
• Accomplishing operational missions as assigned.
• Selecting and nominating Army units for assignment to subordinate theater forces.
• Informing the combatant commander of Army CSS effects on operational capabilities.
• Providing data to supporting operation plans as requested.
• Ensuring signal interoperability.

The ARFOR

2-38. An ARFOR consists of the senior Army headquarters and all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. Providing Army forces within a joint operational area (JOA) is the responsibility of the ASCC of the combatant command. The term ARFOR is commonly used to describe both the headquarters of the Army forces provided to the joint force and the Army forces themselves. An ARFOR commander may not have OPCON of all of Army forces provided to the JFC; however, the ARFOR commander remains responsible for their administrative control (ADCON). See FM 3-100.7 for ARFOR organizational structures.

2-39. An ARFOR is designated whenever Army forces are involved in an operation. Even if separate Army forces are conducting independent operations within a JOA, there is only one ARFOR headquarters in that JOA. ASCCs, numbered army, and corps headquarters (with augmentation) are capable of serving as ARFOR headquarters. In certain smaller-scale contingencies, a division headquarters may be designated as ARFOR headquarters; however, a division headquarters requires extensive augmentation for this mission.

2-40. The ARFOR commander may also serve as JFLCC. A dual-hatted ARFOR commander normally gives some Army-specific tasks to a deputy commander. However, if an ARFOR commander becomes JTF commander, the next senior Army headquarters assumes ARFOR responsibilities. Combatant commanders may receive another Army headquarters for this.

2-41. An ARFOR headquarters may have a TSC attached to perform operational-level logistic and personnel support tasks. These include Title 10 lead service CUL support responsibilities and interagency support requirements.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

2-42. Although the US sometimes acts unilaterally, it pursues its national interests through alliances and coalitions when possible. In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, more than 800,000 military personnel from 36 nations combined their will, forces, and resources to oppose the Iraqi armed forces. Forming the coalition increased the size of the overall force, shared the cost of waging the war, and enhanced the legitimacy of the strategic aims. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated the advantage of successful multinational warfare over unilateral efforts.
2-43. Multinational operations are conducted within the structure of an alliance or a coalition (see JP 3-16; FM 3-16). Military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), may afford participating nations time to establish formal, standard agreements for broad, long-term objectives. Alliance members strive to field compatible military systems, establish common procedures, and develop contingency plans to meet potential threats in a fully integrated manner.

2-44. Nations usually form coalitions for focused, short-term purposes. Often, coalition operations are conducted under the authority of a UN resolution. In successful coalitions, all parties agree to the commitment of forces, even if the resources each invests are different. While each nation has its own agenda, each brings value to the coalition, even if solely by contributing to the legitimacy of the enterprise.

2-45. An Army force commander designated as a multinational force commander faces many complex demands. These may include dealing with cultural issues, interoperability challenges, and an immature theater C2 organization. Commanders may also be required to address different national procedures, the sharing of intelligence, and theater support functions. Since coalition operations are not structured around standing agreements, a preliminary understanding of the requirements for operating with a specific foreign military may occur through peacetime military engagement. These developmental activities include, but are not limited to, ongoing personal contacts, pre-positioning of equipment, exercises, exchange programs, and humanitarian assistance. Every multinational operation is different. Commanders analyze the mission's peculiar requirements so they can exploit the advantages and compensate for the limitations of a multinational force.

2-46. The ASCC function of providing theater-level support is demanding in a multinational environment. Integrating the support functions of several national forces, which may be spread over considerable distances and across international boundaries, is a challenging task. However, multinational
partners provide additional resources to address the CSS challenges inherent in a force projection strategy. Deploying and employing combat power from a force projection base that is friendly, secure, and close to the AO—especially when that base offers a mature infrastructure—is preferable to making a forcible entry from a distant base.

2-47. The Army TSC normally provides multinational CSS and, with proper augmentation, other specific CSS functions. Although each nation is responsible for sustaining the forces it deploys, multinational CSS may achieve significant economy of force. Multinational CSS may be provided by lead nation, role specialist nation, or acquisition and cross-service agreements. However, an international agreement is required to provide support under the lead nation and role specialist nation methods. Ideally, the TSC provides common multinational CSS, and with proper augmentation, other CSS functions, as the ASCC determines. For theater-level support operations to function properly, combatant commanders must clearly articulate their CSS priorities. The formation of multinational CSS staff sections facilitates CSS coordination, reduces competition among multinational partners for common support, and lessens the burden on each (see JP 4-08).

Command and Control of Multinational Operations

2-48. Unity of command is unlikely in multinational operations. The level of command authority vested in a multinational force commander is established by agreement among the multinational partners. The president of the United States retains command authority over US forces. Most nations have similar restrictions. However, in certain circumstances, it may be prudent or advantageous to place Army forces under OPCON of a foreign commander.

2-49. To compensate for limited unity of command, commanders concentrate on achieving unity of effort. Consensus building, rather than direct command authority, is often the key element of successful multinational operations. Political and military policies of multinational partners can limit options for the organization of a multinational command. Long-standing alliances, such as NATO, have integrated command structures with designated nations providing force commanders. Staffs are integrated, and senior representatives from member nations often lead subordinate allied commands. Coalition command is more challenging because it involves combining forces with no standing C2 arrangements. Command relationships and C2 structures usually evolve as the coalition develops. Multinational C2 structures are usually one of three types: parallel command, lead nation command, or a combination of the two (see JP 3-16).

2-50. Parallel command exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces. It is the simplest to establish and may be the only arrangement that satisfies national sensitivities. However parallel command may weaken unity of effort and should be avoided if possible. Under parallel command, multinational forces are directed through existing national chains of command. Decisions are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of member nations and forces. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. Because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if possible.
2-51. **Lead nation command** exists when the nation providing most of the forces and resources provides the multinational force commander. The lead nation can retain its own C2 structure and employ other national forces as subordinate formations. Commanders may combine other nations' staffs to better coordinate complementary capabilities. More commonly, limited integration of national staffs characterizes lead nation command. Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a multinational force. This occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces. This was the command arrangement used by the Gulf War coalition. Western national forces were aligned under US leadership while Islamic forces were aligned under Saudi leadership.

2-52. The creation of an effective multinational staff requires experience, imagination, and cultural sensitivity. There is always a temptation to push multinational participants into secondary positions and do things according to US Army doctrine or habit. Long-term friction and potentially catastrophic misunderstandings usually cancel out the short-term gain in productivity these actions produce. Multinational commanders carefully tailor the staff to balance coalition and US officers, and take particular care to accord coalition officers the same access and influence as their countrymen.

2-53. During multinational operations, US forces establish liaison with assigned multinational forces early. Additional specialized liaison personnel in fields such as aviation, fire support, engineer, intelligence, public affairs, and civil affairs are also exchanged based on mission requirements. This integration fosters common understanding of missions and tactics, facilitates transfer of information, and enhances mutual trust and confidence.

2-54. An integrated command structure is probably most effective when partners are similar in culture, doctrine, training, and equipment, or if extensive cooperative experience exists. This approach requires each troop-contributing nation to receive, understand, plan, and implement missions the same way as the other troop-contributing nations. However, if the multinational force is composed of dissimilar nations, it may require a modified approach to achieve unity of effort. The JFC or multinational force commander may use his own staff for most planning functions, other national augments for their national expertise, and liaison officers to translate and relay instructions to their national forces. As capabilities develop, commanders may also consider using coordination centers to enhance stability and interaction within the multinational force (see JP 3-16; FM 3-16).

**Conducting Multinational Operations**

2-55. Commanders have to accommodate differences in operational and tactical capabilities among multinational forces. For example, not all armies have the staff structures or means to process, reproduce, or rapidly disseminate plans and orders. Decision authority delegated to staffs and subordinate commanders also varies among armies.

2-56. The commander's intent and concept of operations must be clearly and simply articulated to avoid confusion resulting from differences in doctrine and terminology. Integrating indirect fires, naval surface fires, close air support, interdiction, and information operations requires common maneuver
and fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs). All elements of the force must fully understand and strictly adhere to them. Detailed war-gaming, planning, and rehearsals help develop a common understanding of the operation plan and control measures. Operational and tactical plans address recognition signals, FSCMs, air support, communications, and liaison.

2-57. The collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence are major challenges in a multinational operation. There are many instances in which direct access to finished intelligence, raw data, source information, or intelligence systems is not allowed outside national channels. Multinational partners also normally operate separate intelligence systems to support their own policy and military forces. These national systems may vary widely in sophistication and focus. However, at a minimum, each nation contributes valuable human intelligence to the multinational effort. Commanders establish systems that maximize each nation’s contribution and provide an effective intelligence picture to all units. Commanders arrange for the rapid dissemination of releasable intelligence and the use of available intelligence assets by all partners. A multinational intelligence staff at the headquarters facilitates integration of intelligence efforts.

2-58. Mission assignments of multinational units should reflect the capabilities and limitations of each national contingent. Some significant factors are relative mobility and size; intelligence collection assets; and long-range fire, SOF, and organic CSS capabilities. The ability to contribute to theater air and missile defense, training for operations in special environments, and preparing for defensive operations involving weapons of mass destruction is also important. Rapport with the local population, language considerations, and special skills should be considered as well. Multinational commanders may assign host nation forces home defense or police missions, such as rear area and base security. They may also entrust air defense, coastal defense, or a special operation to a single member of the multinational force based on the special capabilities of that force. The national pride of multinational partners is an important intangible factor that is considered when assigning missions.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

2-59. The instruments of national power complement and reinforce each other. By understanding the influence of other agencies, commanders can add diplomatic, informational, and economic depth to their military efforts. US military capabilities allow other agencies to interact with foreign powers from a position of strength and security. Just as integrating different unit capabilities results in the advantages of combined arms warfare, so synchronizing military power with other instruments of national power leads to dynamic strategic capabilities.

2-60. As campaigns and major operations develop, tasks and objectives that directly support military operations but are the responsibility of other agencies are identified. When commanders and planners identify these objectives, they submit them through the JFC to the Joint Staff for consideration and nomination to interagency working groups. Formal and task-specific interagency working groups coordinate policy and assign tasks among the various departments and agencies. Once a department or agency accepts a task, it
reports through the interagency working group to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff links the JFC to this process.

2-61. The intricate links among the instruments of national power demand that commanders consider how all capabilities and agencies can contribute to achieving the desired end state. Interagency coordination forges a vital link between military operations and the activities of organizations such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); governmental agencies of the US, host nation, and partner nations; and regional, international, and UN organizations. Theater strategies routinely employ the capabilities of the entire US interagency network. The National Security Act of 1947 establishes an interagency process for national security-related issues. The National Security Council provides national-level oversight of this process (see JP 3-08).

2-62. Interagency cooperation poses challenges. Among the most difficult is lack of mutual familiarity among the various agencies. In joint operations, leaders from the different services generally share a common tradition and understanding of military matters. Interagency operations bring together leaders and staffs that often have no common experiences. The institutional values and experiences of the separate agencies and departments sometimes have few common points of reference. Some may even conflict. However, education and teamwork can create an understanding and awareness of the missions, strengths, weaknesses, and outlooks of the interagency members. This understanding can mitigate the friction inherent in interagency operations.

2-63. Along with international, host nation, and official US agencies, Army forces frequently operate with NGOs, such as the American Red Cross and World Emergency Relief. Working with NGOs often requires soldiers and leaders to be flexible and adaptive. Sometimes these organizations may not care to cooperate with military forces. However, US armed forces cooperate as much as their mission allows. Effective cooperation and coordination with NGOs reinforces the legitimacy of the armed forces involved in a unified action. Often NGOs—if they are well disposed toward the military—can provide useful information and insights concerning the local populace.

2-64. NGO capabilities can dramatically reduce the military resources required for civil-military operations. NGOs have local contacts and experiences. They conduct such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and developmental programs. NGOs are frequently on the scene of a crisis before US forces. They routinely operate in high-risk areas and usually remain long after military forces have departed. They are a significant factor and must be integrated into planning, preparing, executing, and assessing military operations. Commanders consider the activities of NGOs as well as mutual security and resource or support requirements when conducting unified action.

**CONSIDERATIONS FOR UNIFIED ACTION**

2-65. Joint doctrine addresses employment of Army forces in unified action. Each operation is different; factors vary with the situation and perspectives of the participants. Unified action has military, political, and cultural considerations (see Figure 2-5, page 2-20). These considerations are not all-inclusive.
but highlight factors important to effectively employing Army forces in unified action.

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Figure 2-5. Considerations for Unified Action

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

2-66. Unified action requires commanders to consider the same military factors they consider when conducting joint operations (see FM 3-16; FM 3-16). However, participation of multinational and interagency partners adds additional layers of complexity. The following areas require additional attention from commanders and staffs of units conducting unified action.

Targeting

2-67. The JFC defines how the land component participates in the joint targeting process. JFCs may delegate targeting oversight functions to a subordinate commander or may establish a joint or multinational targeting board. The targeting board may serve as either an integrating center or review mechanism. It prepares targeting guidance, refines joint target lists, and reviews target information from a campaign perspective. It is not normally involved in selecting specific targets and aim points or in developing attack packages (see JP 3-60; FM 3-60).

Fire Support Coordination

2-68. JFCs and multinational force commanders normally establish AOs for their subordinates. Within their AOs, land and naval force commanders are normally supported commanders and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. These commanders designate target priorities and the effects and timing of fires. However, all missions must contribute to accomplishing joint force objectives.

Interdiction is an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.

2-69. Synchronizing operations in land or naval AOs with wider joint operations is particularly important. To facilitate synchronization, JFCs establish priorities for execution of operations throughout the theater or JOA, including within the land and naval force commanders’ AOs. Commanders assigned theater-wide functions by the JFC coordinate with the land and naval force commanders when their operations, to include attacking targets, occur within a land or naval AO (see JP 3-09).
2-70. Army force commanders recognize the enormous potential of synchronizing maneuver with interdiction. They visualize the links between operations within the land AO and joint operations occurring outside it. They identify interdiction targets outside the land AO that can help create conditions for their decisive operations. They advocate combinations of maneuver and interdiction inside and outside the land AO that impose dilemmas on the enemy. Army commanders understand the theater-wide flexibility and reach of unified air operations. When required, they support joint interdiction outside land AOs with Army assets.

2-71. Integrating joint fires requires the development and full understanding of and strict adherence to common maneuver control measures and FSCMs. To ensure timely and effective fires, JFCs develop control measures and FSCMs early and emphasize them continuously. Land and amphibious force commanders may establish a fire support coordination line (FSCL) within their AO to facilitate current and future operations, and to protect the force (see JP 3-09). The FSCL is an FSCM that is established and adjusted by land and amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. FSCLs facilitate the expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. An FSCL applies to all fires of air-, land-, and sea-based weapons systems using any type of ammunition. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially important to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces.

2-72. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in enough time to allow necessary action to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination does not preclude attacking targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to coordinate increases the risk of fratricide and may waste limited resources. Short of an FSCL, the appropriate land or amphibious force commander controls all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations. For example, air strikes short of the FSCL—both close air support and air interdiction—must be under positive or procedural control (for example, by forward air controllers or tactical air control parties) to ensure proper clearance of fires. This control is exercised through the operations staff or with designated procedures.

2-73. The FSCL is not a boundary. The establishing commander synchronizes operations on either side of the FSCL out to the limits of the land AO. The establishment of an FSCL does not create a “free-fire area” beyond the FSCL. When targets are attacked beyond an FSCL, the attacks must not produce adverse effects forward, on, or to the rear of the line. Attacks beyond the FSCL must be consistent with the establishing commander’s priorities, timing, and desired effects. They are deconflicted with the supported headquarters whenever possible.

Air and Missile Defense

2-74. The area air defense commander (AADC) establishes rules of engagement and assigns air defense missions for operational-level air and missile defense assets. Army force commanders communicate their requirements through the JFC to the JFACC and AADC when developing air and missile
defense plans. When the JFC apportions ARFOR assets, including operational-level assets, to the air component for counterair missions, they are generally placed in direct support to the air component. Normally, Army corps retain control of organic air defense units. The JFC may designate the joint or multinational air component commander as the AADC.

Teamwork and Trust

2-75. In unified action, commanders rely upon rapport, respect, knowledge of partners, team building, and patience. Commanders build teamwork and trust in a joint or multinational force in many ways. They and their staffs should establish a direct, personal relationship with their counterparts. Commanders must establish and maintain a climate of mutual respect. They should know their partners as well as they know their adversary. Team building is essential. It can be accomplished through training, exercises, and assigning missions that fit organizational capabilities. Building teamwork and trust takes time and requires the patience all participants. The result is enhanced mutual confidence and unity of effort.

Doctrine, Organization, and Training

2-76. National and service military doctrines vary. Some doctrines emphasize the offense, others the defense. US Army doctrine stresses rapid, agile operations based on exercising disciplined initiative within the commander's intent. When determining the units best suited for particular missions, commanders must be sensitive to doctrinal differences and their consequences. In dealing with joint and multinational forces, commanders must remember that doctrine and organization are closely linked. Removing part of a service's or nation's force structure may make it unbalanced and make it fight in a way not supported by its doctrine and training. Adjusting a component's force structure, if authorized, must be done with extreme caution. Commanders also need to understand the training level of participating forces. All armies do not have the same training resources. A battalion-sized unit from one country may have different capabilities than one from a different country. Commanders must understand that not all organizations are the same.

Equipment

2-77. Different equipment and technologies may result in a mixture of systems in a joint or multinational force. The modernization levels, maintenance standards, mobility, and degree of interoperability of different partners will probably vary. Commanders of a joint or multinational force may have to compensate for significant technological differences among its components. Incompatible communications, unfamiliar CSS needs, and differences in vehicle cross-country mobility can pose difficulties. Some multinational partners may use systems similar to enemy systems, making measures to preclude fratricide vital. However, one nation's capabilities may reduce another's vulnerabilities. Commanders position units and assign command and support relationships to exploit interoperability and complementary capabilities.
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

2-78. Political considerations are prominent in unified action. Gaining and maintaining unity of effort in multinational and interagency environments requires constant attention. Commanders remain aware of the goals and objectives of the various participants. They recognize that control of national forces and nonmilitary partners by their political leaders may affect mission accomplishment. Commanders constantly work to sustain political consensus among the leaders, nations, and organizations involved in the operation.

Goals and Objectives

2-79. States act to serve their national interests. No two partners share the same reasons for conducting a military operation. National goals can be harmonized with a common strategy, but they are seldom identical. Motivations of multinational partners may differ, but multinational objectives should be attainable, clearly defined, and supported by each member state. Successful coalitions and alliances build upon a common purpose. Emphasizing commonalities can reduce friction and maintain cohesion.

National Control of Forces

2-80. Most forces and agencies have the capability for direct and near immediate communications from the operational area to their respective political leaders. This capability can facilitate coordination of political issues. It can also allow those leaders to issue guidance directly to their deployed national forces or veto operational decisions. Likewise, Army force commanders are linked to the appropriate US agencies and political leaders.

Consensus Building

2-81. Reaching a consensus on a goal is the most important prerequisite for successful unified action. Because consensus is frail, commanders continually nurture it. A common goal is important, so commanders expend a lot of time and effort clarifying and restating it. Commanders seek a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable end state and measures of effectiveness. Some partners may resist establishing these to the level of detail that US commanders prefer. The minimum requirement is a set of identifiable military conditions that commanders can use to direct military operations.

CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

2-82. Understanding and dealing with cultural considerations can make the difference between success and failure in unified action. National and organizational culture, language, communication, media relations, and law enforcement all play important roles in this environment.

Cultural and Language

2-83. Each partner in unified action has a unique cultural identity. Military forces, civilian agencies, NGOs, and international organizations approach war and MOOTW from different perspectives. National and organizational values, standards of social interaction, religious beliefs, and organizational discipline all affect the perspectives of multinational partners. Partners with similar cultures and a common language face fewer obstacles to
interoperability. Even seemingly minor differences, such as dietary restrictions or officer-enlisted relationships, can significantly affect military operations. Commanders may have to accommodate cultural sensitivities and overcome diverse or conflicting religious, social, or traditional requirements.

2-84. Overcoming language barriers is a significant challenge. Unified action is often multilingual. Even when partners share a common language, different terminology and jargon can hinder understanding. Whether spoken or written, all participants must understand all communications. Commanders recognize translation difficulties. Translating orders adds time to planning. Translation errors can cause mistakes or misunderstandings. Few translators have both the language and cultural expertise and the depth of doctrinal understanding necessary. Dedicated liaison and linguist teams can mitigate this problem but cannot eliminate it. Clear, concise orders and briefings are easier to translate than complicated ones. Simplicity helps achieve the mutual understanding necessary for success. Backbriefs to commanders ensure that multinational subordinates understand intent and tasks.

Communication

2-85. Differences in individual assumptions and organizational perspectives can cloud common understanding. Commanders involve representatives from each partner in defining issues in clear, unambiguous, agreed-upon terms. How something is said is particularly important in the interagency environment. To preclude misunderstandings, military planners anticipate confusion and take measures to clarify and establish common terms with clear and specific usage. To reduce duplication and increase coherence, commanders get from all participants a clear expression of their perceived role and mission as well as the resources they intend to contribute. Understanding each participant’s agenda helps commanders synchronize the efforts of the each organization throughout the campaign. Common understanding also helps identify obstacles, such as conflicting multinational or interagency priorities.

Media Relations

2-86. Within security requirements, commanders facilitate national and international press activities. In multinational environments, media from partner states have their own standards and requirements. Commanders work with leaders of partner forces and their national press elements to develop an open, mutually beneficial environment. To avoid misunderstanding, senior multinational political and military representatives establish media ground rules that are as simple as possible. To facilitate foreign and US media relations, US forces follow the DOD Principles of Information whenever possible. Military plans anticipate the effect of media actions. The media shape public attitudes and can influence operations. Commanders recognize that gaining and maintaining public support requires clearly expressing the desired end state, objectives leading to it, and measures of effectiveness through the media. Different partners do not necessarily send the same messages; but commanders determine and coordinate methods to avoid contradictions.
Law Enforcement

2-87. Often US forces will not have the authority or capability to enforce civil laws in the operational area. Commanders seek clear law enforcement guidance from US and multinational political leadership during planning for unified action. The entire chain of command must understand status of forces agreements (SOFAs), or status of mission agreements (SOMAs), which apply to UN operations. Where civil law enforcement is present and functioning, commanders establish systems and procedures to use it. Where civil law enforcement systems and organizations are not available, commanders should deploy with appropriate US forces or use the capabilities of other partners.
Chapter 3

Strategic Responsiveness

Generally, he who occupies the field of battle first and awaits his enemy is at ease; he who comes later to the scene and rushes into the fight is weary.

Sun Tzu
The Art of War

3-1. Strategic responsiveness requires Army forces trained, organized, and equipped for global operations, and commanders and units proficient at force projection. Strategically responsive Army forces—including active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) forces based in the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas—generate and sustain maximum combat power at the time and place joint force commanders (JFCs) require.

RESPONSIVE ARMY FORCES

3-2. Strategic responsiveness imposes a unique set of dynamics on the US Army. The Army depends on assets apportioned by the National Command Authorities and allocated by the US Transportation Command to combatant commanders and JFCs. The combatant commander establishes the priority for movement of forces into the theater. That decision drives allocation of strategic lift and ultimately determines how rapidly Army forces deploy. Although US strategic lift assets exceed those of any other nation, the available lift is almost never enough to move large Army forces at one time. Consequently, commanders carefully tailor both the elements of the force and the sequence in which they deploy them to match theater conditions.

3-3. The range of possible scenarios complicates training. Army forces cannot train for every possible mission; they usually train for war and prepare for specific missions as time and circumstances permit. The volatile nature of crises requires Army forces to simultaneously train, deploy, and execute.
Strategic Responsiveness

Commanders conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and continuously assess) operations with initial-entry forces, while assembling and preparing follow-on forces. To seize the initiative during deployment and the early phases of an operation, commanders accept calculated risks, even when the enemy situation is not well developed. Balancing these dynamics is an art mastered through study, experience, and judgment.

3-4. Modernization will transform Army force projection capabilities. Contingency operations in the 1990s normally followed a sequence of alert, deployment, extended build-up, and shaping operations—followed by a period of decisive operations to terminate the conflict. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm exemplify this sequence. The interim Army force now being developed will consist of lethal and highly mobile initial-entry Army units that will deploy, contain large-scale aggression, and shape the situation in the land area of operations (AO) for much earlier decisive operations. In smaller-scale contingencies, combinations of modernized brigades and forcible entry units will provide JFCs with decisive initial-entry capabilities. When fielded, the objective Army force will achieve the strategic responsiveness necessary to conduct nearly simultaneous deployment, shaping, and decisive operations in a manner similar to that of Operation Just Cause, but against more robust opponents. The Army is modernizing combat service support (CSS) capabilities as well. Improvements are underway to reduce the CSS footprint and replenishment demands by leveraging CSS reach capabilities. At the same time, the Army is investing in new systems that minimize support requirements and radically improve the manner in which it transports and sustains soldiers, equipment, and materiel.

3-5. The payoff for mastering the art of strategic responsiveness is operational success. Fast deploying and rapidly expansible Army forces provide JFCs with the means to introduce an operationally significant land force into a crisis theater on short notice. Responsiveness provides JFCs a preemptive capability to deter adversaries, shape the situation, and fight and win if deterrence fails. Responsive Army forces provide immediate options for seizing or regaining the operational initiative. They complement and reinforce the other services with combat, combat support (CS), and CSS units that can be swiftly tailored, deployed, and employed to produce decisive effects.

ATTRIBUTES OF STRATEGICALLY RESPONSIVE ARMY FORCES

3-6. Seven attributes of strategically responsive forces drive programmatic and operational requirements. The Army is redesigning the force around them. Structure, equipment, and training—including deployment doctrine; power projection platforms; command and control (C2) systems; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; and joint transportation systems—establish the foundation for responsive forces.

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3-1
3-7. Each operation is different: there may not be a single ideal deployment sequence that optimizes all seven force attributes. However, from an operational perspective, commanders train their forces to emphasize all seven. Upon alert, commanders tailor and sequence the force to balance the attributes while meeting JFC requirements.

Responsive

3-8. Responsiveness is an attitude that spans operational planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. It establishes the conditions for successful operational and tactical maneuver at the outset of operations. Responsiveness is more than the ability to quickly deploy: it requires that the right Army forces—those the JFC needs to deter an adversary or take decisive action if deterrence fails—deploy to the right place at the right time. Forward deployed units, forward positioned capabilities, peacetime military engagement, and force projection from anywhere the needed capabilities reside all contribute to Army force responsiveness.

3-9. Responsiveness also emphasizes training, planning, and preparation for deployment. Commanders recognize that crises rarely allow sufficient time to correct training deficiencies between alert and deployment. They ensure that their units are prepared to accomplish their mission essential task list (METL) tasks before alert and to concentrate on mission-specific training in the time available afterwards. In addition, commanders emphasize individual preparation and equipment readiness. Finally, commanders review and practice alert and deployment plans and procedures, updating them based on lessons learned. They pay particular attention to the automated data used for deployment planning, ensuring that it accurately reflects unit organization and equipment.

3-10. Responsiveness requires balancing the demands of readiness with the realities of day-to-day training. Commanders develop and implement mission readiness postures appropriate for their unit. They evaluate the mission of the unit and carefully design mission readiness cycles to match the required readiness posture.

Deployable

3-11. Army forces combine training, facilities, soldiers, and equipment to deploy with speed and force. Commanders view deployment as more than getting people and equipment on ships and airplanes; they visualize the entire process, beginning with the fully operational unit deployed in theater, and reverse plan to the unit's predeployment location. They include deployment details in standing operating procedures (SOPs). Plans focus not only on the sequence of actions but also on force packages for different scenarios. Deployment rehearsals occur as often as time permits. Commanders and subordinate leaders conduct reconnaissance of deployment facilities and routes, and review contingencies. They stress junior leader initiative and responsibility as essential during deployment. The intelligence community supports deployability through readiness and the ability to quickly collect information about the enemy or adversary, process it into intelligence, and disseminate that intelligence as relevant information.
Strategic Responsiveness

Agile

3-12. Agility is a tenet of Army operations as well as a responsive force attribute. A responsive, agile force package is one that is sustainable and mobile enough to accomplish the mission. Limitations on available lift compel commanders to balance competing mission requirements, in some cases developing innovative solutions. It also requires commanders to anticipate a full range of tasks and include capabilities to accomplish them. Finally, agile forces are mentally and physically able to transition within or between types of operations without losing momentum. Commanders develop this state of mind through tough, realistic training. Mentally agile commanders, staffs, and soldiers adapt force packages, strategies, and tactics to mission requirements in dynamic environments.

Responsive and Agile—Operation Uphold Democracy

The 1994 Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti demanded Army forces to demonstrate an extraordinary degree of agility and responsiveness. Months before operations began, the 82d Airborne Division prepared plans for a short-notice forcible entry into Haiti. Completed plans detailing the use of overwhelming lethal force to seize key targets awaited only a decision to execute. Then, on 19 September, with the 82d already in flight to execute the plan, word suddenly arrived that a last-minute diplomatic effort had succeeded in securing the permissive entry of US forces.

With the sudden change in conditions, the Haiti mission passed from the invasion force, which returned home, to the 10th Mountain Division, which began arriving in Port-au-Prince in a matter of hours. In addition, special operations forces (SOF) blanketed the country within a week. Active engagement of the populace quickly established a measure of trust that furthered both SOF security and the effectiveness of the mission. Meanwhile, although initial living and working conditions in Port-au-Prince and elsewhere were predictably austere, CSS forces responded rapidly as equipment and other resources poured into Haiti.

American agility notwithstanding, conditions on the ground in Haiti remained unclear. Joint Task Force (JTF) 180 commander, LTG H. Hugh Shelton, found himself in the unanticipated position of negotiating the terms of a transition of power and working with representatives of the very regime he had earlier expected to remove. In turn, JTF 190 commander, MG David Meade, worked to secure the cooperation of police and civil officials in the capital. Army forces responded flexibly to a highly fluid and ambiguous situation.

Versatile

3-13. Like agility, versatility is a tenet of Army operations. Army forces conduct prompt and sustained full spectrum operations with forces tailored to accomplish the mission. Versatility requires Army force packages able to reorganize and adapt to changing missions. Commanders carefully tailor and sequence forces into theater, making sure forces have the necessary C2, combat, CS, and CSS assets. Whenever possible, commanders deploy multifunctional teams. However, they understand that teams gathered from different
organizations do not execute efficiently unless trained to work together. Thus, training emphasizes teamwork and adaptability. Commanders stress versatile C2 and practice reconfiguring headquarters to control multiple missions.

Lethal

3-14. Army forces combine the elements of combat power to defeat the enemy. When deployed, every unit—regardless of type—generates combat power and contributes to the fight. From the operational and tactical perspectives, commanders ensure deployed Army forces have enough combat power to overwhelm any likely enemy. The art of strategic responsiveness requires that commanders balance the ability to mass the effects of lethal combat systems against the requirement to deploy, support, and sustain the units that employ those systems. Commanders assemble force packages that maximize the lethality of initial-entry forces consistent with both the mission and the requirement to project, employ, and sustain the force. They tailor and sequence follow-on forces to increase both the lethality and operational reach of the entire force.

Survivable

3-15. Survivability combines technology and methods that afford the maximum protection to Army forces. Lethality enhances survivability: lethal forces destroy enemies before they strike and can retaliate if necessary.

3-16. Deploying commanders integrate sufficient force protection assets to ensure mission accomplishment. Engineer, air defense, and chemical units increase the survivability of deployed Army forces. As with the other attributes, lift constraints and time available complicate the situation. Survivability requires an astute assessment of operational risk. In many operations, rapid offensive action may provide better force protection than massive defenses around lodgment areas.

Sustainable

3-17. Generating and sustaining combat power is fundamental to strategic responsiveness. Commanders reconcile competing requirements: On one hand, Army forces must accomplish JFC-assigned missions. On the other, they need adequate sustainment for operations extended in time and depth. Commanders tailor force packages to provide sufficient CSS while exercising every solution to reduce the CSS footprint. In some cases, commanders augment CSS capability with host nation and contracted support.

CONSIDERATIONS OF STRATEGIC RESPONSIVENESS

3-18. Applying the art of strategic responsiveness requires mastery of the considerations of strategic responsiveness. These considerations complement and supplement the attributes of strategically responsive Army forces.
Anticipation

3-19. Commanders anticipate future operations. They train their units for alert and deployment and prepare them for any likely change of mission. If units are assigned a peacetime region or mission focus, mental and physical preparation and planning can occur long before alert and deployment. The intelligence system gives commanders the ability to anticipate future operations by providing strategic through tactical indications and warning and maintaining intelligence readiness. Appropriate actions include initiating or adjusting mission- and region-specific training, organizing C2 for entry operations, conducting staff training, ordering and posting maps, studying available infrastructure, coordinating with appropriate agencies, and training deployment procedures. These actions allow units to deploy without additional training that may slow deployment.

3-20. Decisions about size, composition, structure, and deployment sequence create the conditions for success in theater. Ideally, commanders identify potential decisions before the actual event. Prior planning develops options to meet possible situations. Exercises refine concepts and procedures. However, the nature of an operation can change significantly before execution. Commanders ensure that their plans and decisions do not foreclose options the deployed force may need later. Operational and tactical plans as well as the deployment process and flow need to be flexible enough to accommodate changes made after the alert. Other important decisions include—

- Command and support relationships.
- Prioritization of unit and equipment movement (see JP 3-35).
- Transportation modes for early deploying units.
- Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I) responsibilities and procedures (see JP 4-01.8; FM 4-01.8).
- Plans for interacting with media and other civilian agencies and organizations.

Command and Control

3-21. Strategic and operational commanders decide strategic aims, force requirements, force allocation, which organizations to mobilize and deploy, and when to do so. Seldom are these decisions clear at the outset. Mobilization, deployment, and employment occur simultaneously against a backdrop of fog and friction, challenging commanders to make timely decisions that set the basis for future success. Effective C2, equipment, facilities, intelligence, and procedures give commanders the support they need to visualize the operation, describe their vision to subordinates, and direct actions to implement their decisions. In particular, modern information systems provide commanders with a common operational picture (COP) that allows them to see and track forces from home station through arrival in theater to combat
employment. The COP—which includes friendly, threat, and environmental elements—helps commanders make timely, accurate decisions about force sequence and direct resources and forces where needed by units in theater.

3-22. Modular C2 enhances the commander’s ability to tailor the headquarters for split-based-operations throughout the operation. For example, deployment may physically separate units from their higher headquarters and sister elements. A modular C2 structure allows the leadership of a deploying unit to retain command of the unit and control RSO&I in the theater staging base before employment.

3-23. Commanders require home station, en route, and in-theater communications that are secure, reliable, and timely. Communications must be compatible with the mix of supporting forces and services in theater, including civilian agencies of the US government. Units establish communications with other organizations and services participating in the operation.

3-24. Army and joint systems track forces and forecast their arrival in theater. Force tracking reports combat status to JFCs. It provides immediate and constant information about present and forecasted unit combat capability during force projection operations. Support units and staffs report unit movements, while operations staffs track them and report the build-up of operational capability. Force tracking requires a definition of readiness against which commanders can evaluate unit status and visibility of all assets required. JFCs normally define combat readiness based upon the operation or situation.

3-25. Commanders visualize force projection as one seamless operation. Deployment speed sets the initial rate of military activity in theater. Commanders understand how speed, sequence, and mix of deploying forces affect their employment options. In turn, they see how their employment concept establishes deployment requirements. Commanders prioritize the force mix on the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) to get forces in theater where and when required. They recognize that decisions made early in the force projection process affect employment throughout the JFC’s campaign. Singular focus on the land component plan may result in the incorrect force sequencing. Active and continuous command involvement during all stages of force projection, coupled with detailed reverse planning, combine to ensure the right forces with the right support are available and ready to conduct decisive operations when needed.

Lethality of the Deploying Force

3-26. An important strategic factor is the early introduction of credible, lethal forces into the theater. This action may quickly convince a potential enemy that further aggression is too costly. Initial-entry forces need to be interoperable and flexible enough to handle unforeseen circumstances. Initial-entry forces require enough combat power to establish and protect lodgments and begin simultaneous shaping operations immediately upon arrival. Doing this requires tailored and very precise relevant information. The ability to fight at
the outset is crucial to the successful execution of the theater campaign plan. A tailored force with the capability to dominate situations early enables the JFC to seize the initiative.

**Force Tailoring**

3-27. *Force tailoring* is the process of determining the right mix and sequence of units for a mission. Army commanders tailor forces to meet specific requirements determined by the JFC and passed through the Army service component command (ASCC). Units identified for rapid deployment are tailored to mission requirements. They standardize, as much as possible, an initial-entry force package based on anticipated deployment requirements. These force packages consist of configured and basic loads that are included in the TPFDD. Units develop tailored load plans to match anticipated contingencies. These force packages include enough combat power to sustain and protect themselves for the short term, wherever they might go. Follow-on forces are tailored to meet specific concerns of the long-term mission.

3-28. Generally, commanders tailor subordinate forces. For example, a corps commander may tailor a deploying division by augmenting its organic assets with an additional infantry brigade and two corps artillery brigades. During tailoring, commanders balance the combat power necessary to accomplish the mission with the speed of deployment to ensure the deploying force is operational and sustainable upon arrival.

3-29. During mission analysis and force tailoring, commanders pay special attention to strategic lift, pre-positioned assets, host nation support, and theater support contracts. For an unopposed entry operation, for example, commanders schedule CSS, engineer, military police, civil affairs, and combat health support to deploy early, particularly if faced with limited host nation support and infrastructure. Faced with a forcible entry operation, commanders tailor their flow and mix differently, placing the right mix of combat units in the early deploying echelons. Commanders may find they need to substitute one type of unit for another or add units that have never trained together. This places a premium on early and continuous teamwork. Such teamwork, emphasized by visits and other contacts, builds the cohesion in the new team that is essential for mission success. Tailoring focuses on the vertical integration of the force; it ensures capabilities are matched in the proper combinations and sequence at each echelon. Tailoring the force includes force allocation, force augmentation, and force refinement.

3-30. **Force Allocation.** Commanders tailor a force to ensure that its size and capabilities—especially C2 capabilities—are sufficient to accomplish the mission. This process begins with the combatant commander allocating a basic force. Normally, the basic force is a combat unit—a division, an armored cavalry regiment, a Special Forces group, or a combined arms maneuver brigade. In stability operations or support operations, however, the basic force may be a CS or CSS unit, such as a military police, medical, civil affairs, or water purification unit.

3-31. **Force Augmentation.** Force augmentation rounds out the basic force with specialized capabilities. Army force structure is designed so that at each echelon has a set of capabilities that augment it from the next higher echelon.
Once the combatant commander allocates the basic force, the major Army command, in conjunction with the ASCC, augments it with the necessary supporting units. Figure 3-1 illustrates some representative echelons above division augmentations for a deploying division. Based on the mix of operations, these capabilities augment the organic capabilities of the basic force. They are not normally assigned to the division, although they may be placed under its operational control or in direct or general support to it.

The combatant commander requests an additional division from the NCA. The NCA allocates the division to the combatant command. The owning MACOM provides the division.

Echelons above Division

Army planners augment the division with combat, CS, and CSS forces. Experience and planning guides provide the basis for augmentation. Where possible, the habitual assignment of subordinate units to headquarters is maintained.

The ASCC commander assigns allocated forces to the in-theater headquarters based on the combatant commander's plan and METT-TC.

Figure 3-1. Force Allocation and Augmentation

3-32. Force Refinement. The basic force and its augmentation forces are refined to account for the multiple constraints of the projected operation. Force refinement is a repetitive, continuous process that involves all Army components and members of joint and interagency organizations. It includes JFCs and representatives from the Department of State, Joint Staff, Army Staff, ASCC, ARFOR headquarters, and other involved government agencies. Force refinement involves METT-TC adjustments, force sequencing, and staff tailoring, and task organizing.

- METT-TC Adjustments. Commanders analyze the basic force and its general augmentation using the factors of METT-TC—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations—to identify any changes necessary to account for the realities of the planned operation. Force allocation seldom produces an exact fit. Commanders refine the tailored force based on factors such as those in Figure 3-2. They apply the factors of METT-TC to the assigned unit organizations to determine necessary adjustments.
Strategic Responsiveness

Based on METT-TC, the ARFOR tailors and refines the force package to meet the conditions in theater. The process of tailoring and refining the force package continues as the situation develops and the force deploys.

Figure 3-2. Allocation: Force Refinement

- **Force Sequencing.** Commanders next compare the in-theater situation—in terms of the factors of METT-TC—against available lift to determine the appropriate deployment sequence. Balancing rapid response with the mix of combat power and resources that will accomplish the mission while protecting the initial-entry force is critical. Commanders seek a balance that provides protection, efficient deployment, and a range of options for responding to possible conditions. Lift availability is always a constraint, so difficult trade-off decisions are routine. For example, commanders often balance early deployment of combat forces against the need to deploy tailored CSS capability to generate and sustain combat power. Commanders and staffs keep in mind not only the priority for each capability's arrival but also its relationship to other capabilities. These relationships are key; changing the deployment sequence reschedules associated capabilities.

- **Staff Tailoring.** Commanders tailor units and staffs, both in size and organization, to meet mission conditions. The standard peacetime staff may undergo significant changes in both size and organization to meet conditions. For example, the 1st Armored Division staff and headquarters underwent a dramatic transformation upon its commitment to
Bosnia as the Task Force Eagle headquarters (see Figure 3-3). To gain the personnel necessary to round out the staff, a headquarters identifies requirements to its higher headquarters. This begins a series of requests that are either filled by the next higher headquarters or passed up the chain of command.

- **Task Organizing.** Force tailoring is not synonymous with task organizing. While tailoring is a method to match force capabilities necessary to accomplish a mission, task organizing is the establishment of an organization with certain command relationships to accomplish the tasks at hand.

**Compat Service Support**

3-33. Generation of decisive combat power requires carefully balancing CSS assets with combat and CS assets. Achieving the right balance is an art; commanders attempt to maximize combat power while deploying only essential CSS capabilities. Too little CSS ties Army forces to their lodgment, unable to create and exploit oppor-

**Factors Affecting CSS Operations**

- Enemy threat
- Size of friendly forces
- Maturity of the theater
- Theater evacuation policy
- Supported force’s CSS needs
- CSS infrastructure
- Availability of in-theater supplies
- Host nation support
- Theater support contracts.
- Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements
Strategic Responsiveness

Training

3-35. Training is the linchpin of strategic responsiveness. Prior to alert, units train for wartime missions and conditions first. Unless directed otherwise, division and lower-level commanders develop battle focused METLs. When corps and higher-level commanders anticipate a stability mission or support mission, they may direct subordinate commanders to develop METLs to support employment in those missions. Leaders at every echelon conduct mission essential individual and collective training before and during deployment. Tactical commanders identify tasks that apply to all types of operations and ensure individual and collective proficiency in them. Commanders accept risk and defer training for some tasks until the unit alerts and prepares for deployment.

3-36. After alert, Army forces conduct mission-tailored training and rehearsals. If time permits, commanders conduct mission rehearsal exercises (MRXs) to reinforce their vision and intent. A good MRX exposes units to conditions approximating those in theater. Commanders ensure that rehearsals are realistic and take full account of chance, friction, and ruthless, thinking opponents. Good rehearsals allow room for initiative and improvisation. Even when time is very short and resources scarce, commanders conduct some type of rehearsal, such as map-based or computer-supported virtual MRXs, with subordinates.

3-37. Force projection operations vary in time, distance, and size but always include certain actions and functions. Most force projection operations include data preparation; planning; and rail, air and ship loading. These operations provide opportunities for multiechelon training. Training—to include rehearsals—begins at home station and continues throughout an operation, as the situation permits. Units also perform the coordination necessary to pass
lessons to follow-on forces. Training to maintain readiness for future operations continues after hostilities cease.

FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS

3-38. Force projection is the military component of power projection. It is a central element of the national military strategy. Projecting the force anywhere in the world involves AC and RC units, the mobilization base, DA civilians, and industry. Army organizations and installations, linked with joint forces and industry, form a strategic platform to maintain, project, and sustain Army forces, wherever they deploy.

3-39. Force projection encompasses a range of processes: mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment (see Figure 3-4). These processes occur in a continuous, overlapping and repeating sequence throughout an operation. Force projection operations are inherently joint and require detailed planning and synchronization. Decisions made early in the process may determine the success of the campaign.

- **Mobilization** is the process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. It assembles and organizes resources to support national objectives. Mobilization includes activating all or part of the reserve components, and assembling and organizing personnel, supplies and materiel (see JP 4-05; FM 3-35).

- **Deployment** is the movement of forces and materiel from their point of origin to the AO. This process has four supporting components: pre-deployment activities, fort to port, port to port, and port to destination (RSO&I) activities (see JP 3-35; FM 3-35 series; FM 4-01.8).

- **Employment** is the conduct of operations to support a JFC (see JP 3-0 series; FM 3-100.7). Employment encompasses a wide array of operations including but not limited to—
  - Entry operations (opposed or unopposed).
  - Shaping operations (lethal and nonlethal).
  - Decisive operations (combat or support).
  - Postconflict operations (prepare for follow-on missions or redeployment).

- **Sustainment** involves providing and maintaining levels of personnel and materiel required to sustain the operation throughout its duration. It is essential to generating combat power. CSS support may be split-based between locations within and outside of CONUS (see FM 4-0).

- **Redeployment** is the process by which units and materiel reposture themselves in the same theater; transfer forces and materiel to support another JFC’s operational requirements; or return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home or demobilization station upon completion of the mission. Redeployment operations encompass four phases:
  - Recovery, reconstitution, and pre-redeployment activities.
  - Movement to and activities at the port of embarkation.
  - Movement to the port of debarkation (POD).
  - Movement to home station (see JP 3-35; FM 3-35).
Decisions made early in the force projection process are important to the success of the campaign.

Figure 3-4. The Force Projection Process

FORCE PROJECTION CHARACTERISTICS

3-40. The objective of force projection is to conduct decisive operations so rapidly that the enemy is defeated before he can effectively confront US forces. That objective requires efficient and effective projection of Army forces. Taken as a whole, effective and efficient force projection exhibits four characteristics: precision, synchronization, speed, and relevant information. Commanders incorporate these characteristics into the conduct of force projection operations.

Precision

3-41. Efficient force projection makes maximum use of available time and lift. Eliminating wasted space and time requires precision in every activity and each piece of data related to it. The effect of precision is far-reaching; its payoff is speed of deployment and increased combat power in theater. Precise deployment equipment lists, for example, allow correct lift assets to be quickly assigned against requirements. Precision in loading increases departure speed and safety. Precision in meeting the JFC’s time line supports the concept of employment. Up-to-date doctrine, realistic training, an adequate support structure, and timely enablers provide the framework for precision.
Synchronization

3-42. Commanders synchronize deployment activities. Resources—lift assets, enablers, time, and information—are scarce. Effective synchronization produces maximum use of every resource. Synchronization normally requires explicit coordination among deploying forces and staffs, supporting units and staffs, a variety of civilian agencies, and the other services. Frequent and realistic joint exercises and training are the key to successful synchronization.

Speed

3-43. Commanders view force projection as a race between friendly forces and the enemy or situation. The side that achieves a decisive operational capability first seizes the initiative. Thus, it is not the velocity of individual stages or transportation means that is decisive; it is the combat ready force deployed in theater before the enemy is ready or the situation gets out of control.

3-44. Speed is more than miles per hour: it is the sustained momentum achieved with the complete complement of joint lift assets. The volume steadily delivered by ship can often outpace the pieces delivered by air in terms of operational capability. Speed is also the velocity of the entire force projection process, from planning to force closure. It depends on many factors, to include maximizing the other force projection characteristics. Some factors are established before deployment starts. Planning—exemplified in factors such as the existence of efficient planning tools and maintaining unit integrity—helps operations progress smoothly. Allocating resources to deployment training results in trained unit movement officers and preparation for safe and efficient loading. Submission of accurate reports, timely arrival of throughput enablers, delivering capabilities, and POD throughput combine precision, synchronization, and relevant information. These and other factors all contribute to speed.

Precision and Speed—VII Corps Deploys to Southwest Asia

The Army projects power to support joint operations quickly and on short notice. In November 1990, VII Corps shifted its mission from the defense of Western Europe to coalition operations in Southwest Asia. The Operation Desert Shield mission required VII Corps to conduct crisis action planning for an unfamiliar theater while task organizing with units from V Corps and CONUS. The headquarters developed TPFDD and cross-leveled personnel and equipment on the move to the seaports of embarkation. The corps support command created new CSS capabilities to replace nondeployable host nation support assets. The 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, arrived in Southwest Asia early and established port support activities at Dammam and Jubayl in Saudi Arabia to assist VII Corps with RSO&I. VII Corps deployed over 35,000 soldiers from Europe to Southwest Asia and off-loaded over 6,000 tracked vehicles at the ports between November 1990 and February 1991. VII Corps units underwent technology modernization in theater, repainted their vehicles for desert warfare, and conducted numerous training exercises prior to executing Operation Desert Storm.
Strategic Responsiveness

Relevant Information

3-45. Successful force projection requires commanders to combine knowledge of the deployment process, judgment, and relevant information. There is a short period in which deploying commanders make decisions that determine the conduct of the deployment and the available employment options over time. Many of the decisions are impossible or very hard to change. Making the right choices requires relevant information. For example, relevant information and understanding the TPFDD are imperative when establishing high-priority items, determining sequencing, deciding how to use time, and setting priorities. Relevant information concerning theater throughput allows commanders to manage deployment to enable employment. Relevant information does not guarantee a smooth deployment; however, combined with their experience and judgment, relevant information allows commanders to control the situation and make good decisions.

JOINT SYSTEMS

3-46. Force projection is an integral part of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES is constantly evolving. It includes joint operation planning tools, policies, procedures, and reporting structures (see JP 5-03.1). Communications and automated data processing support the entire system. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities associated with joint operations. It provides the framework within which JFCs design theater operations. Army force projection is nested within this framework. The global command and control system (GCCS) is the worldwide automated network of systems that supports JOPES. Army commanders ensure that unit data provided to GCCS databases is accurate. Up-to-date information allows joint planners to produce timely, efficient, and accurate force projection estimates and plans. Several deployment planning tools under development, such as the Transportation Coordinators Automated Information for Movement System II (TC-AIMS II) and the Joint Force Requirements Generator II (JFRG II), will enhance the deployment process and accelerate TPFDD development.

3-47. A crisis for which no plan exists requires the JFC to rapidly develop a TPFDD. Standard contingency force packages support this time-sensitive

Time-Phased Force Deployment Data

The TPFDD is the JOPES database portion of an operation plan. It contains time-phased force data, nonunit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan. The TPFDD includes—

- In-place units.
- Units to be deployed.
- Desired sequence for arrival.
- Routing of forces to be deployed.
- Movement data.
- Estimates of nonunit-related cargo.
- Personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the force deployments.

The TPFDD also contains estimates of common-user transportation requirements and requirements to be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources.
preparation cycle. While METT-TC may cause variations, tailored force packages contain a balanced mix of combat, CS, and CSS capabilities.

ENTRY OPERATIONS

3-48. When responding to a crisis, initial-entry forces often establish a lodgment area and expand it into a theater base. From the lodgment, US forces conduct RSO&I, reconfigure, build combat capability, and train. They also assist multinational and host nation forces, protect the force, and acclimate themselves. The JFC sequences combat and support units into the lodgment so that the force gains the initiative and completes deployment. Army forces always prepare for simultaneous deployment and employment. Even in stability operations and support operations, the force is prepared to defend or attack to retain the lodgment. Units may enter the theater in a variety of ways. They either enter unopposed or use force.

Unopposed Entry

3-49. Whenever possible, US forces seek unopposed entry, which may be either assisted or unassisted. Assisted entry requires the cooperation of the host nation. In assisted entry, initial entry Army forces are tailored to deploy efficiently and transition to follow-on operations quickly. The CSS package is tailored to take full advantage of the host nation assets. RSO&I focus on cooperative effort to expedite moving units to their tactical assembly areas. For example, Saudi Arabia provided extensive support to US forces during deployment for Operation Desert Shield.

3-50. Often, circumstances leading to deployment make it impossible for the host nation to provide secure facilities for US forces as they arrive. An entry operation in such a case is an unassisted entry. An example of an unassisted entry was the deployment of US forces to Haiti during Operation Uphold Democracy. In unassisted entries, JFCs deploy balanced combinations of combat, CS, and CSS forces. Forces with enough combat power to secure an adequate lodgment must be dispatched immediately. Initial-entry CSS forces must be included to establish and support RSO&I within the lodgment. Force sequencing for an unassisted entry is similar to that of a forcible entry.

Forcible Entry

3-51. A forcible entry is an offensive operation for seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition (see JP 3-18). Supported by joint firepower, forcible entry operations capitalize on strategic and operational mobility to surprise the enemy, seize a lodgment, and gain the initiative. Once the assault force seizes the lodgment, it normally defends to retain it while the JFC rapidly deploys additional combat power and sustainment by air and sea. When conditions are favorable, the JFC may combine a forcible entry with other offensive operations in a coup de main, achieving the strategic objectives in a simultaneous major operation. Operation Just Cause is an example of a forcible entry coup de main.
3-52. The Army maintains formidable forcible entry capabilities. There are three types of forcible entry operations: air assault, parachute assault, and amphibious assault. The Army specializes in parachute assault and air assault. The Marine Corps specializes in amphibious assault; Marines usually conduct air assaults as part of an amphibious operation. Air assaults and parachute assaults permit JFCs to introduce combat power very quickly. They accomplish this without the normal hindrances imposed by port, airfield, or beach restrictions. For example, an airborne or air assault force can be delivered in a matter of minutes. The entry force either resolves the situation or secures a lodgment for the rapid delivery of larger forces by aircraft or ships. The three forms of forcible entry complement each other. Combining all three may allow the JFC to immediately seize the strategic, operational, and tactical initiative.

3-53. Usually, forcible entry operations secure an initial lodgment that includes an airfield. Once secure, this airfield becomes the focal point for rapid reinforcement of the entry force by air-delivered combat, CS, and CSS units. When required, initial-entry forces expand the lodgment to include a port or suitable seaport of debarkation for follow-on forces. When the lodgment is secure, follow-on forces deploy into the lodgment.

3-54. Forcible entry operations are complex and always joint. Often only hours separate alert and deployment. The demands of simultaneous deployment and combat employment create a unique set of dynamics. Operations are carefully planned and rehearsed at training areas and in marshaling areas. In contrast to most strategic deployments, equipment is configured for immediate use; ammunition and fuel are stored on board. Joint and Army commanders carefully balance C2, combat, CS, and CSS assets to obtain the maximum combat power quickly. Wherever possible, the commanders exercise C2 from aircraft and ships and use air- and sea-based fire support assets. Doing this dedicates the available strategic lift to placing Army maneuver and sustainment forces on the ground. For example, the staff of an initial-entry force may orbit in specially equipped Air Force aircraft, while Navy and Air Force elements deliver precision strikes to support the force.

SECURITY OF FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS

3-55. Enemies possess the motives and means to interrupt the deployment flow. Threats to deploying forces may include advanced conventional weaponry, weapons of mass destruction, and various types of sea and land mines. Sea and air PODs are particularly vulnerable targets since they are the entry points for forces and equipment. POD operations involve relatively soft targets; in addition to military forces and materiel, host nation support personnel, contractors, and civilians may all be working there. Many of these lucrative targets are within the range of enemy forces. A successful attack on a POD can have a major impact on force projection momentum. Commanders at all levels focus attention on security actions that reduce vulnerabilities. To avoid threats to entry operations, the force may operate through ISBs.

INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASES

3-56. An intermediate staging base is a secure staging base established near to, but not in, the areas of operations (see Figure 3-5). ISBs
are temporary staging areas en route to an operation. They may also be used to sustain forces in the AO (see FM 4-0). In the best case, secure bases are available within the AO. Unfortunately, the situation that compels deployment may negate the advantages of basing within the AO. When deciding whether to operate through an ISB, JFCs weigh sustainment requirements against risks.

Figure 3-5. Intermediate Staging Base

3-57. ISBs are normally located within the theater of operations and outside the AO. They are established outside the range of enemy tactical and operational fires and beyond the enemy political sphere of influence. In cases where the force needs to secure a lodgment, an ISB may be critical to success. Using ISBs is not without a price. Because they are transshipment points, ISBs add handling requirements and can increase deployment time. They may also require infrastructure (personnel and equipment).

3-58. ISBs may serve as the principal staging base for entry operations. They take advantage of existing, sophisticated capabilities, serving as efficient transfer points from high volume commercial carriers to a variety of tactical, intratheater transport means. Tactical transports can serve smaller, austere ports or—with the right lift—bypass them. Upon arrival at an ISB, a force conducts limited RSO&I and configures for operations. The JFC can then project forces ready to conduct operations immediately into the AO. While not a requirement in every case, an ISB can provide a secure, high-throughput facility when circumstances call for it. ISBs are not limited to a single location; an ISB can consist of several points within a region. The capability and throughput of available facilities determine ISB configuration.